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RETALIATION BACKLASH
Alex B. Long*
Abstract: Until fairly recently, the narrative regarding employment retaliation plaintiffs has
been that the federal courts—and the Supreme Court in particular—are generally sympathetic
to employees claiming illegal workplace retaliation. This narrative has changed drastically
over the past few years, to the point that there has been a backlash among courts to the initial
wave of plaintiff success. In this respect, the evolution of retaliation law largely tracks the
evolution of disability law. This Article argues that the evolution of these areas of the law
illustrates a simple but fundamental point about the interpretation of statutes regulating the
workplace at present: unless the text of the statute strongly supports a reading that limits the
discretion traditionally afforded to employers under the employment at-will doctrine, courts,
as a general rule, will not adopt that reading, nor will they apply the statute in that manner.
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“[T]he court cited its own age-old quote: ‘[T]his Court does not
sit as a “super-personnel department,” second guessing whether’
the employer’s decision was prudent. That’s poetry, right?”
—Employment defense lawyer1
INTRODUCTION
One of the more enduring narratives regarding employment
discrimination law is that the federal courts are hostile to discrimination
claims.2 In example after example, the Supreme Court and lower courts
have adopted and applied narrow readings of employment discrimination
statutes that have made it more difficult for plaintiffs to survive summary
judgment, let alone prevail at trial.3 Thus, it is now almost an article of
1. Lehr Middlebrooks & Vreeland, P.C., How Can I Demote Thee? Let Me Count the Complaints,
ALA. EMP. L. LETTER, Mar. 2013 (second alteration in original).
2. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 104–05 (2009) (noting the
perception that courts are biased against employment discrimination plaintiffs); Margaret H. Lemos,
Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 830 (2011) (“[R]eports of judicial hostility to, and
backlash against, employment discrimination statutes are legion in the academic literature.”).
3. See Tristin K. Green, Racial Emotion in the Workplace, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 983 (2013)
(discussing, for example, how the “stray remarks” doctrine narrows the reach of discrimination law);
L. Camille Hebert, Conceptualizing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace as a Dignitary Tort, 75
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faith among employment law scholars that federal courts have little
patience with employment discrimination suits.
Until fairly recently, the narrative regarding retaliation plaintiffs stood
in sharp contrast. Here, the narrative for some time was that the federal
courts—and the Supreme Court in particular—are generally sympathetic
to employees claiming illegal workplace retaliation.4 In contrast to the
Supreme Court’s generally restrictive interpretations of the antidiscrimination language in federal statutes, the narrative has traditionally
been that the Court has taken a more pragmatic approach when
interpreting the anti-retaliation language in federal statutes governing the
workplace.5
This narrative concerning retaliation law had at least some basis in
reality for over fifteen years. But the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar6 represented
a dramatic departure from the general trend favoring retaliation plaintiffs.
In Nassar, the Court held that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision
employs a demanding “but-for” standard of causation rather than the more
liberal “motivating factor” standard employed by some lower courts.7 And
while prior Supreme Court retaliation decisions were almost uniformly
pro-plaintiff on the surface, the decisions have not had the sort of
liberalizing effect on lower court retaliation decisions one might expect.
Instead, lower courts seem to have responded to the Court’s pro-plaintiff
decisions by taking a stricter approach to retaliation cases and making it
more difficult for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment.8

OHIO ST. L.J. 1345, 1347 n.11 (2014) (noting how lower courts have interpreted Supreme Court
decisions so as to reduce employer liability for supervisor harassment); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking
Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 85 (2011) (discussing the courts’ narrow conception of
the concept of intent in discrimination cases).
4. See Frank C. Morris, Jr., Oral Discomfort: Supreme Court Holds that Verbal FLSA Complaints
Suffice, LAB. & EMP. PRAC. ACT NOW ADVISORY (Epstein, Becker & Green P.C., Washington, D.C.),
Mar. 25, 2011, at 2, http://www.ebglaw.com/content/uploads/2014/06/43644_Act-Now-AdvisoryOral-Discomfort.pdf [https://perma.cc/477D-QPEG] (“[E]mployers should be on notice that the
Supreme Court and, therefore, the lower courts are extremely receptive to retaliation claims and
unlikely to dismiss them on technical grounds.”); Abigail Rubenstein, High Court Poised to Shape
Landscape for Retaliation Suits, LAW360 (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/434764/
high-court-poised-to-shape-landscape-for-retaliation-suits [https://perma.cc/8XLU-Z6Q4] (“[T]he
high court has often shown itself sympathetic to plaintiffs claiming retaliation in recent years,
attorneys say.”).
5. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
6. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
7. Id. at 2532–33.
8. See infra notes 67–123 and accompanying text.

07 - Long.docx (Do Not Delete)

718

5/26/2018 5:27 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:715

Statutory anti-retaliation provisions exist in large measure to help
ensure that those who have been discriminated against or who have
information about such discrimination are not deterred from coming
forward for fear of retaliation by their employers.9 The recent trend toward
more restrictive interpretation and application of anti-retaliation
provisions has led to some concern that the underlying purposes of these
provisions are being hindered.10
At least two questions emerge from this reassessment of retaliation law.
The first is whether the increasingly restrictive approach of federal courts
to retaliation claims is reflective of increased hostility to such claims. In
other words, has the prevailing attitude of the federal judiciary become
less sympathetic to the complaints of retaliation plaintiffs? The second
question is, if there has been an attitudinal shift, why? Why are more
federal courts more hostile to retaliation claims than in the recent past?
In this Article, I posit that while the initial successes enjoyed by
retaliation plaintiffs created something of a false sense of optimism, there
has, in fact, been a general shift in the judiciary’s approach to retaliation
claims. The shift that has taken place bears a striking resemblance to the
judicial backlash that occurred following implementation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.11 The Article further posits that some of
the same reasons that contributed to the disability backlash are
contributing to the current retaliation backlash.
To provide the background necessary to evaluate this argument, Part I
of the Article discusses the elements of a standard employment retaliation
claim. Part II examines the evolution of retaliation claims in the federal
judiciary, from the initial boom time for retaliation plaintiffs to the leaner
times in more recent years. This Part examines how the judicial backlash
toward retaliation claims has made it more difficult for retaliation
plaintiffs to prevail. Part III explores the similarities between the courts’
treatment of disability discrimination claims and retaliation claims and
suggests that the same concerns that drove the initial American With
9. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (“The antiretaliation
provision seeks to prevent employer interference with ‘unfettered access’ to Title VII’s remedial
mechanisms.” (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997))); Craig Robert Senn,
Redefining Protected “Opposition” Activity in Employment Discrimination Cases, 37 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2035, 2079 (2016) (“The purpose and policy behind these provisions is simple: to encourage
employee complaints or reports of inappropriate workplace conduct.”).
10. See Senn, supra note 9, at 2080 (arguing that “[t]he current definition of protected opposition
activity clearly frustrates antiretaliation law’s purpose and policy”); Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation
and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031, 2069 (2016) (“If the underlying purpose of
retaliation law is to encourage people to complain about discrimination, then the current majority
rules fail to accomplish this for a wide swath of potential retaliatory conduct.”).
11. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. & 47 U.S.C.); infra Part III.

07 - Long.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

5/26/2018 5:27 PM

RETALIATION BACKLASH

719

Disabilities Act (ADA) backlash—most notably, concerns over intruding
upon employer discretion—are driving the retaliation backlash. Finally,
Part IV argues that the evolution of these areas of the law illustrate a
simple but fundamental point about the interpretation of statutes
regulating the workplace at present: unless the text of the statute strongly
supports a reading that limits the discretion traditionally afforded to
employers under the employment at-will doctrine, courts, as a general
rule, will not adopt that reading, nor will they apply the statute in that
manner. In light of this reality, this Article suggests several possible
legislative revisions to the anti-retaliation provisions contained in Title
VII and other workplace laws.
I.

RETALIATION CLAIMS: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE AND
BACKGROUND

Courts have articulated the framework for retaliation claims in a variety
of ways. But however the prima facie case is stated, a retaliation plaintiff
will always need to prove the following elements: (1) that the employee
engaged in protected conduct; (2) that the employer’s retaliatory action
was materially adverse; and (3) that there is a causal connection between
the protected conduct and the retaliatory action.12
A.

Protected Conduct

To establish a prima facie case, an employee must first show that the
employee engaged in protected conduct.13 Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision lists two types of protected activity: opposition conduct and
participation conduct.14
1.

Opposition Conduct

First, an employer is prohibited from retaliating against an employee
because the employee “has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by [Title VII].”15 This portion of the anti-retaliation
provision, known as the opposition clause, most obviously applies when
an employee somehow communicates to the employer the employee’s
belief that the employer has engaged in unlawful discrimination and
12. Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 319 (5th Cir. 2004); Sperino, supra note 10,
at 2037.
13. Davis, 383 F.3d at 319.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
15. Id.
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objects to the employer’s conduct.16 But the opposition clause may apply
in other instances as well.
In Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville,17 the Supreme
Court further elaborated upon the meaning of the opposition clause.
Crawford involved an employee who had allegedly been retaliated against
after participating in an employer’s internal investigation into allegations
of sexual harassment. When, during the internal investigation, the
employee was asked whether she had ever observed any inappropriate
conduct on the part of the organization’s human resource director, the
employee described several instances of such conduct.18 The Court
concluded that the employee had engaged in protected opposition conduct
when she provided “an ostensibly disapproving account of sexually
obnoxious behavior toward her by a fellow employee.”19 In doing so, the
Court rejected the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ view that the opposition
clause “demands active, consistent ‘opposing activities’” before conduct
is protected.20 Nor, under the Court’s holding, must the employee actually
instigate or initiate a complaint to be protected.21 Instead, less
demonstrable forms of opposition may be protected, provided they are
still “resistant” or “antagonistic” to an employer’s actions.22
Importantly, courts have also not interpreted the language of the
opposition clause literally. The opposition clause protects an employee
who opposes “any practice made an unlawful employment practice.” Read
literally, an employee would only be protected where the employer’s
practice was actually illegal. However, recognizing the impracticability of
such a standard, courts have consistently only required that an employee
have a reasonable belief that that the employer’s actions are unlawful.23
2.

Participation Conduct

Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an
employee “because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
16. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009).
17. 555 U.S. 271 (2009).
18. Id. at 274.
19. Id. at 276.
20. Id. at 275 (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 211 F. App’x 373, 376 (6th Cir.
2006)).
21. Id. at 277.
22. Id. at 276 (brackets omitted).
23. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (per curiam) (referencing lower
court’s standard and assuming it applied). This “reasonable belief” standard is discussed in greater
detail infra section II.B.
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participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under [Title VII].”24 This clause of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision,
known as the participation clause, most obviously applies when the victim
of discrimination files a formal charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).25 But the clause also
applies when an employee participates as a witness in a formal proceeding
under Title VII.26
Title VII’s participation clause is broader than its opposition clause in
at least two respects. First, it contains the “in any manner” language,
which courts have characterized as being “exceptionally broad” in
scope.27 Given the broad protection afforded by the clause, courts have
held, for example, that the provision protects such action as helping a
coworker file a discrimination complaint.28 In addition, unlike the
opposition clause, courts have typically not imposed any type of
reasonableness requirement. Thus, the participation clause protects those
who were not only wrong or unreasonable in their belief that an employer
engaged in illegal conduct, but also those who made charges that were
defamatory or malicious.29
B.

Material Adversity

A retaliation plaintiff must also prove that the employer’s retaliatory
action was materially adverse. Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision
prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against” an employee who
has engaged in protected activity.30 The Supreme Court has explained that
this means that a retaliation plaintiff must establish that the employer’s
actions “would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or
job applicant.”31
When the Court settled on this standard in Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway v. White32 in 2006, it had several competing standards
from which to choose. One option would have been to extend a remedy

24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
25. Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989).
26. See Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding clause
applied when witness testified in a deposition).
27. See, e.g., Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 n.18 (5th Cir. 1969).
28. E.g., Eichman v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 597 F.2d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1979).
29. Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2012).
31. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
32. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
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only to an employee who suffered an adverse employment action, meaning
a material change in the terms and conditions of employment.33 Another,
more restrictive approach would have limited retaliation claims to
situations in which the employee suffered an ultimate employment action,
“such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and
compensating.”34
Instead, relying on both the statutory language and the purposes
underlying anti-retaliation provisions, the Court settled on the more
expansive “materially adverse” standard.35 Under this approach, an
employer’s retaliatory action is actionable when it “could well dissuade a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.”36 The Court observed that, unlike Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision, Title VII’s anti-retaliation language was not
limited in scope to employer actions that impacted the terms and
conditions of employment.37 Indeed, the Court noted that there might be
some forms of employer retaliation having no impact on the terms and
conditions of employment that would be just as effective in deterring
employees from reporting unlawful discrimination or engaging in other
forms of protected activity.38 As the primary purpose of anti-retaliation
provisions is to preserve employees’ “unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms,” it made sense to define actionable retaliation in
terms of employer conduct that interferes with such access.39
Thus, the Court held that employer retaliation is actionable where it
would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee.40
Importantly, the Court elaborated on this idea by noting that materiality
must be judged by the particular circumstances of the employee in
question. As an example, the Court noted, “[a] schedule change in an
employee’s work schedule may make little difference to many workers,
but may matter enormously to a young mother with school-age
children.”41 The Court recognized that, given the differences in
workplaces, it made little sense to establish a laundry list of prohibited
forms of employer conduct: “[t]he real social impact of workplace
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 60.
Id. (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 64.
Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
Id. at 57.
Id. at 69.
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behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.”42 In other
words, “[c]ontext matters.”43 Thus, not only did the Court reject a
retaliation standard tied to employer actions impacting the workplace, it
adopted a standard that requires courts to consider what might be material
to the employee in question.
C.

Causal Connection

Finally, a retaliation plaintiff must also establish a causal connection
between the protected activity and the employer’s action.44 Specifically, a
retaliation plaintiff must establish that the protected activity was a “butfor” cause of the employer’s adverse action.45 Where the adverse action
follows the protected activity closely enough in time, courts sometimes
permit temporal proximity to serve as a proof of the causal connection.46
But where close temporal proximity is lacking, a plaintiff may be required
to introduce other evidence to satisfy the causal connection requirement.47
II.

THE RISE AND FALL OF RETALIATION LAW

By and large, plaintiffs who have brought statutory employment
retaliation claims have fared quite well before the Supreme Court.48 As a
result, the common perception has been that, contrary to the Court’s
discrimination decisions, the Court’s retaliation decisions have had “a
pro-employee tilt.”49 The Court’s 2013 decision in University of Texas
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013).
45. Id.
46. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam) (noting this
approach by some courts).
47. See id. at 273 (“The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer’s
knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality
to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be ‘very close.’”
(quoting O’Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001))).
48. See Alex B. Long, Employment Retaliation and the Accident of Text, 90 OR. L. REV. 925, 926
(2011) (discussing plaintiffs’ successes).
49. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in the EEO Office, 50 TULSA L. REV. 1, 37 (2014); see also
Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV.
917, 918 (2009) (stating that the Court has been “pro-employee” in its retaliation decisions); Kimberly
A. Pathman, Note, Protecting Title VII’s Antiretaliation Provision in the Wake of University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 109 Nw. U. L. REV. 475, 491–92 (2015) (referring to the
Court’s pro-employee reputation in retaliation cases).
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Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, which holds retaliation plaintiffs
to a demanding causation standard,50 effectively shattered this perception.
What’s more, as this Part discusses, lower courts have increasingly held
retaliation plaintiffs to demanding standards with respect to other aspects
of a plaintiff’s prima facie case.51 Thus, some of the initial optimism that
arose from the Supreme Court’s early retaliation decisions has
increasingly given way to a sense that courts are undermining the
purposes of statutory anti-retaliation provisions. This Part examines the
federal courts’ evolving approach to employment retaliation claims.
A.

Retaliation Boom

The Supreme Court’s first meaningful foray into interpreting the antiretaliation provisions contained in Title VII and related statutes was in
1997 in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.52 There, the Court held that the term
“employees” in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision referred not just to
current employees but to former employees as well.53 That conclusion,
while reasonable, seemed far from obvious.54 Nonetheless, in a
unanimous opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court relied heavily
on the text of the statute—with a brief nod to the underlying purpose of
anti-retaliation provisions55—to provide an expansive reading of the
statute.56
Robinson set the stage for a run of victories by employment retaliation
plaintiffs asserting statutory claims before the Court over the next two

50. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525.
51. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 908 (2008) (discussing lower courts’ strict approach when deciding
whether an employer’s retaliation is actionable); Lawrence D. Rosenthal, A Lack of “Motivation,” or
Sound Legal Reasoning? Why Most Courts Are Not Applying Either Price Waterhouse’s or the 1991
Civil Rights Act’s Motivating-Factor Analysis to Title VII Retaliation Claims in a Post-Gross World
(but Should), 64 ALA. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2013) (discussing lower courts’ handling of causation
issues); Sperino, supra note 10, at 2035–36 (discussing lower court opinions involving the issue of
the reasonableness of an employee’s belief that employer conduct was unlawful).
52. 519 U.S. 337 (1997). The seminal employment discrimination case, McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), originally involved claims of discrimination and retaliation, but the
retaliation claim had dropped from the case by the time it reached the Supreme Court. Id. at 797.
53. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346.
54. There was a circuit split at the time. Id. at 340.
55. See id. at 346 (explaining that the plaintiff’s textual arguments were persuasive in light of the
purpose of anti-retaliation provisions to maintain unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms).
56. Id. at 340–46.
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decades.57 In 2005, for example, the Court held that Title IX prohibited
employment retaliation, despite the fact that the statute contained no
express prohibition on retaliation.58 In 2006, the Court decided Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White, which, as discussed, chose an
expansive standard for actionable retaliation from among a range of more
restrictive options. Other similar decisions followed, with the high-water
mark perhaps being the Court’s 2011 decision in Thompson v. North
American Stainless, LP.59 In Thompson, the Supreme Court held that Title
VII affords a remedy not just to those who engage in protected activity,
but also to those who are retaliated against because another employee has
engaged in such activity.60
On the surface, these decisions seemed to create a pro-employee
environment in the courts for retaliation plaintiffs. Commentators took
notice and frequently characterized the Supreme Court as being
sympathetic to the plight of the victims of workplace retaliation or at least
of having taken a less formalistic, more pragmatic approach to the
interpretation of statutory anti-retaliation provisions than it had antidiscrimination provisions.61 Defense lawyers also took note. Speaking in
57. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011) (holding that
making an oral complaint of unlawful conduct is protected conduct under the Fair Labor Standards
Act’s anti-retaliation provision); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011) (holding
that firing an employee due to the protected activity of employee’s fiancée amounts to unlawful
retaliation); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271 (2009) (holding that employee
engaged in protected activity when she participated in employer’s internal investigation of sexual
harassment allegations); CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (holding that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 provides for a retaliation cause of action for an individual who suffers for retaliation for
attempting to assist another); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008) (holding that the antiretaliation provision of the federal sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
provides a remedy for retaliation victims); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)
(holding that a retaliation plaintiff need not show an adverse employment action in order to make out
a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167
(2005) (holding that Title IX prohibits recipients of federal education funding from retaliating against
an individual who complains about unlawful sex discrimination, despite the absence of any express
statutory prohibition on retaliation). The two notable exceptions to this trend are University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013), which held that a
Title VII retaliation plaintiff must satisfy the demanding “but for” causation standard, and Clark
County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (per curiam), which held that the
plaintiff’s internal complaints of discrimination were not protected because no reasonable person
could believe that employer’s actions were unlawful.
58. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179.
59. 562 U.S. 170 (2011).
60. Id. at 178.
61. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 126 (2014) (summarizing
the scholarship in the field as concluding that the Court had taken a more pragmatic approach in the
case of retaliation cases than in discrimination cases); David L. Hudson, Jr., Back at Ya: Employee
Retaliation Claims Pay Big Before the High Court, ABA J., June 1, 2011, at 21 (“The high court
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2012, one employment defense lawyer opined that “unquestionably,
retaliation is the greatest challenge for employers today.”62
One likely result of all of these pro-plaintiff retaliation decisions was a
dramatic increase in the number of retaliation claims. In 2009—coming
shortly on the heels of a string of victories for retaliation plaintiffs before
the Supreme Court—retaliation claims became the most common
individual charge filed with the EEOC.63 Between 1997 and 2012, the
number of individual charges of retaliation in violation of federal law filed
with the EEOC more than doubled.64 This stands in sharp contrast with
the number of statutory discrimination claims involving various forms of
discrimination (most notably race, sex, and age), which have stayed
relatively constant or increased only slightly during this same time
period.65 Thus, it is fair to say that prior to 2013, the narrative regarding
employment retaliation cases was one of employee success.66
B.

Retaliation Backlash

While retaliation plaintiffs were generally enjoying success in front of
the Supreme Court, there was cause for concern among plaintiffs’ lawyers
who were paying attention. Lower courts were often taking a more
restrictive approach to retaliation claims.67 To be sure, some restrictive
rules had already started to develop prior to the spate of Supreme Court

continues to be a favorable forum for employees who allege retaliation from their employers.”);
Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 381–
82 (2010) (observing that the Court’s approach in retaliation cases “typically has led to enhanced
employee protection as compared to other types of employment-law cases”).
62. Scott Flander, The Trouble with Retaliation, HUM. RESOURCE EXECUTIVE, June 16, 2012, at
19.
63. David Long-Daniels & Peter N. Hall, Risky Business: Litigating Retaliation Claims, 28 ABA
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 437, 437 (2013).
64. Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://
perma.cc/EUZ3-94TR].
65. For example, in 1997, 29,199 charges of race discrimination were filed with the EEOC. In 2015,
that number was 31,027. Id. Two notable exceptions to this trend of relative stability in the number
of discrimination charges are religion claims, which have more than doubled, and color claims, which
have more than tripled. Id.
66. See Long-Daniels & Hall, supra note 63, at 448 (stating that given then-recent Supreme Court
decisions, “the law has shifted to favor plaintiffs who assert retaliation claims” and has made it easier
for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment).
67. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 51, at 908–09 (discussing early lower court decisions
following Burlington Northern in which courts took a strict approach to the question of material
adversity).
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retaliation decisions.68 But as the Court began to interpret statutory antiretaliation provisions in a way that tended to benefit employees, the lower
courts were sometimes narrowing the scope of the provisions. And in
2013, the win streak that retaliation plaintiffs had enjoyed in front of the
Court came to a dramatic halt. This section examines the reversal of
fortune for retaliation plaintiffs.
1.

Protected Conduct

One of the most significant limitations lower courts have placed on
retaliation claims is the demanding standard they often impose regarding
whether an employee who opposed employer conduct had a reasonable
belief that the conduct was unlawful. As discussed, in order for an
employee’s conduct to be protected under the opposition clause, the
employee must have a reasonable belief that the conduct being opposed is
actually unlawful.69 In Clark County School District v. Breeden,70 the
Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that this was the proper
interpretation of Title VII’s opposition clause.71 Numerous lower courts
had already adopted this same interpretation by the time Breeden was
decided,72 but Breeden undoubtedly led to the uniform adoption of the
reasonableness requirement when assessing whether opposition conduct
is protected.73
68. For example, lower courts were already well on their way toward establishing the bright-line
rule that an employee who files an internal complaint of discrimination is protected from retaliation,
if at all, by the narrower opposition clause rather than the more expansive participation clause by the
time the Supreme Court started considering retaliation cases more frequently. See Vasconcelos v.
Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d
1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989); Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airport Auth., 952 F. Supp. 1129, 1134 (E.D.
Va. 1997); Shinwari v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1210 (D. Kan. 1998); Morris v.
Bos. Edison Co., 942 F. Supp. 65, 70 (D. Mass. 1996).
69. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
70. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).
71. Id. at 271.
72. See, e.g., Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994); Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale
& Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981).
73. See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 83 (2005) (“Since Breeden, courts
have required plaintiffs bringing retaliation claims under the opposition clause to demonstrate a good
faith, reasonable belief that the underlying conduct amounted to unlawful discrimination.”); Moberly,
supra note 61, at 447 (stating Breeden “paved the way for courts uniformly to adopt the reasonablebelief standard for a broad range of statutes”). Professor Lawrence D. Rosenthal has noted that there
were at least some courts that, prior to Breeden, merely required that a plaintiff have a subjective,
good faith belief that the conduct was unlawful, not that the belief also be objectively reasonable.
Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the Objectively
Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activity Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 39
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1135–36 (2007).
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While Breeden accelerated the trend toward adoption of the
“reasonable belief” rule, the decision also laid the groundwork for the
adoption of a restrictive interpretation of this concept by lower courts.
Breeden involved an employee who complained about a single incident of
sexual harassment. Specifically, the plaintiff, her supervisor, and others
were assigned the task of reviewing job applications. The supervisor read
aloud a crude comment contained in one of the applications, which
prompted the supervisor and another male employee to chuckle.74 Relying
upon its past sexual harassment decisions, the Court noted that this
conduct did not qualify as the type of severe or pervasive behavior
necessary to support a sexual harassment claim.75 Indeed, the Court
concluded, no reasonable employee could believe that the conduct
actually violated Title VII; thus, the plaintiff’s opposition to her
supervisor’s behavior was unprotected from retaliation.76
Standing alone, Breeden represents something of a mixed bag for
retaliation plaintiffs. In contexts outside of the employment
discrimination realm, courts have sometimes required that the conduct
complained of must actually be illegal before a plaintiff is entitled to
protection.77 In this respect, Breeden’s “reasonable belief” standard is
decidedly more pro-plaintiff than it might have been. At the same time,
given employees’ relative lack of knowledge of employment
discrimination law, Breeden perhaps presents a closer case on the issue of
whether a reasonable employee could believe that the conduct in question
was unlawful than the Court’s per curiam opinion lets on.78 But following
Breeden, not only have lower courts required that retaliation plaintiffs
reasonably believe that the conduct they are opposing is unlawful, they
have often imposed a demanding standard of reasonableness.79
In determining whether a retaliation plaintiff’s belief that an
employer’s conduct was unlawful under federal employment law when
the plaintiff opposed the employer’s conduct, courts often hold these non-

74. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 269.
75. Id. at 271.
76. Id.
77. Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 1135 n.37.
78. See Brake, supra note 73, at 82 (criticizing Breeden).
79. See Brake, supra note 61, at 138 (“Not surprisingly, since Breeden itself involved a sexual
harassment complaint, the reasonable belief requirement has spawned a now-sizeable body of cases
in which internal complaints about harassment are unprotected because the underlying conduct was
not severe or pervasive enough to be actionable.”); Moberly, supra note 61, at 447–48 (“Despite this
seemingly employee-friendly standard, however, lower courts often have applied the reasonablebelief requirement to narrow, rather than broaden, retaliation protection.”).
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lawyer plaintiffs to a demanding standard.80 Courts have held that it was
unreasonable for individuals to believe that an unlawful hostile work
environment could be created when a co-worker referred to another
individual as a “stupid mother fucking nigger” and a “stupid ass nigger”
in the employee’s presence during a lunch break;81 when, in the company
break room, a co-worker referred to two black individuals as “black
monkeys” and suggested they be put “in a cage with a bunch of black apes
and let the apes f—k them”;82 and when the EEOC issued a for-cause
determination on the employee’s sexual harassment complaint after her
manager made comments about the size of the employee’s breasts in the
presence of others.83
Importantly, existing precedent often works against a retaliation
plaintiff in at least two ways. First, once a decision concluding that an
employee’s belief that she was opposing unlawful conduct was not
reasonable under a given set of facts, retaliation plaintiffs are often forced
to try to distinguish their facts from those of the adverse precedent. For
example, Butler v. Alabama Department of Transportation84 is the
decision involving the co-worker who referred to another individual as a
“stupid mother fucking nigger” and a “stupid ass nigger” in the plaintiff’s
presence during a lunch break.85 The plaintiff claimed she was
subsequently retaliated against after reporting the statements to her
immediate supervisor.86 According to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, the plaintiff’s belief that she had reported unlawful conduct to
her supervisor was “not even close” to objectively reasonable.87 Thus,
Butler sends a clear message to would-be plaintiffs (and their lawyers)
that their retaliation claims will be dead on arrival unless the conduct in
question is significantly more egregious than that in Butler.
80. See Brake, supra note 73, at 89 (criticizing the approach of courts and noting “that most people
lack the legal expertise to ascertain” what qualifies as sexual harassment); Matthew W. Green, Jr.,
What’s So Reasonable About Reasonableness? Rejecting a Case-Law Centered Approach to Title
VII’s Reasonable Belief Doctrine, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 759, 794 (2014) (noting the strict standard to
which plaintiffs are held despite the fact “that most persons . . . are unfamiliar with Title VII case
law”); Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of
Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 955 (2007) (stating “courts appear to hold an
employee to the standard of what a reasonable labor and employment attorney would believe, rather
than what a reasonable employee would believe”).
81. Butler v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 2008).
82. Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 336 (4th Cir. 2006).
83. Henderson v. Waffle House, Inc., 238 F. App’x 499, 503 (11th Cir. 2007).
84. 536 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2008).
85. Id. at 1210.
86. Id. at 1211.
87. Id. at 1213.
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The difficulty retaliation plaintiffs often face in attempting to
distinguish prior precedent also illustrates the second obstacle prior
precedent imposes upon plaintiffs. In reaching their decisions as to the
reasonableness of an employee’s belief as to the unlawfulness of the
conduct, courts often rely heavily on precedent actually defining unlawful
conduct. The retaliation plaintiff who complains about a co-worker openly
using two racist slurs on one occasion must grapple with the decisional
law explaining when a discrimination claim involving a hostile work
environment exists under Title VII. Thus, the plaintiff will be forced to
explain how she could reasonably have believed the conduct was unlawful
when decisional law is clear that, generally, a single offensive utterance
does not create a hostile work environment and that “a racially derogatory
remark by a co-worker, without more, does not constitute an unlawful
employment practice.”88
Of course, by directly linking the reasonableness of an employee’s
belief to existing discrimination precedent, courts essentially require
employees to be versed in the nuances of Title VII’s hostile-environment
law and other discrimination theories. Indeed, at least one court has been
explicit about this reality, explaining several times in an opinion (that was
subsequently reversed) that an employee who was “versed in the relevant
law” could not have reasonably believed that the conduct complained of
was unlawful.89 This approach is particularly problematic in light of the
fact that previous studies have shown that employees are not, in fact,
versed in employment law and frequently overestimate the protection
afforded to them by law.90

88. Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 961 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Boyer-Liberto v.
Fontainbleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 284 (4th Cir. 2015); O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d
625, 631 (7th Cir. 2011); Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 336 (4th Cir. 2006); King v. Piggly
Wiggly Ala. Distrib. Co., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1231 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (concluding, in light of
Butler, that retaliation plaintiff lacked an objectively reasonable belief that being called “boy” by
another employee at work was unlawful). But see La Grande v. DeCrescente Distrib. Co., Inc., 370
F. App’x 206, 212 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding factual issue existed regarding whether plaintiff could
reasonably believe that a hostile work environment existed on the basis of two isolated instances).
89. Howell v. Corizon, Inc., No. 12–0272–WS–N, 2013 WL 6068346, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 18,
2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Howell v. Corr. Med. Servs., 612 F. App’x 590 (11th Cir.
2015) (per curiam). In reversing the decision, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
“[a]lthough it is a close call,” the defendant’s conduct was “sufficient to render objectively reasonable
Plaintiff’s good faith belief that she was opposing an unlawful employment practice.” Howell, 612 F.
App’x at 591.
90. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common Law
Case for Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1558, 1558 n.236 (2014) (citing
numerous articles purporting to establish that employees mistakenly believe they enjoy something
close to “just cause” protection from firing).
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While many labor and employment lawyers could explain why these
forms of behavior were not actually unlawful, it is counter-productive to
the goals of anti-discrimination law to hold that an employee, confronted
with these situations, was unreasonable in believing that the conduct was
unlawful and thus unprotected from employer retaliation.91 Compounding
the problem is the fact that employer policies and existing law strongly
encourage employees to report suspected unlawful conduct. Supreme
Court precedent gives employers an affirmative defense to a charge of
unlawful harassment where they adopt effective anti-discrimination
policies and internal reporting mechanisms for employees who believe
they have observed unlawful discriminatory conduct.92 The end result is a
situation in which the average employee, unaware of the subtleties of
federal employment law, may run the risk of being fired or otherwise
retaliated against with impunity when the employee mistakenly concludes
that a single instance of sexual harassment or the single use of a racial
epithet is unlawful and decides to complain.
2.

Material Adversity

Lower courts have also increasingly taken a strict view regarding the
material adversity standard developed in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway v. White. According to Burlington Northern, an employer’s
retaliatory action is “materially adverse” where it might dissuade a
91. See Green, supra note 80, at 787 (explaining that holding employees to a demanding standard
“has the potential to deter complaints, undermining the informal resolution of claims and avoidance
of harm principles that gave rise to the reasonable belief standard”).
92. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998), the Supreme Court recognized an affirmative defense whereby
employers could avoid strict liability for a supervisor’s harassment of an employee if no tangible
employment act was taken against an employee if the employer can establish: “(a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b)
that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. The
first prong of the affirmative defense is typically thought of as requiring an effective anti-harassment
policy. Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., 259 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2001). Sometimes these
policies encourage employees to report sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination that is
not, in fact, unlawful under federal law. See Brake, supra note 61, at 118. Moreover, an employee
who fails to report possible discrimination or who delays in doing so may be precluded from bringing
a discrimination claim against the employer. This is true even where the employee delays reporting
in an attempt to gather evidence so that her employer is more likely to believe her or so that the
employee can better understand the nature of the offending conduct. See Matvia, 259 F.3d at 269
(applying this principle in the case of an employee who waited before reporting). Thus, employees
face strong incentives to report objectionable conduct, even though it might not amount to unlawful
conduct. Given the state of retaliation law, employees may face a classic catch-22: report possible
discrimination and risk retaliation, only to be told that they have no retaliation claim, or not report
and be told that they have no discrimination claim.
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reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity.93 Yet, as
Professor Sandra Sperino has explained, “lower courts routinely dismiss
cases by ruling that certain consequences, such as threatened termination
or negative evaluations, would not dissuade a reasonable person from
filing a discrimination complaint.”94
There are at least two noteworthy aspects to these lower court
decisions. The first is that courts often seem to disregard the Supreme
Court’s instruction that materiality must be judged from the perspective
of the individual plaintiff in question and within the context of the specific
workplace in question. In Burlington Northern, the Court specifically
cautioned against the “simple recitation of the words used or the physical
acts performed” in deciding whether an employer’s adverse action
qualifies as materially adverse.95 Thus, while recognizing that certain
seemingly minor retaliatory actions will ordinarily not be actionable, the
result might change depending on the specific circumstances of the
individuals involved, the nature of the workplace, or other relevant
considerations.96 As an example, the Court cited the possibility that a
schedule change “might be inconsequential to many workers but could
dissuade a working mother from submitting a complaint.”97
Yet lower courts have sometimes ignored the Supreme Court’s
admonition that “context matters” and established bright-line rules
regarding what qualifies as a materially adverse action.98 According to
Professor Sperino, “[i]n case after case, appellate courts determine that a
certain action does not constitute an adverse action without mentioning
any of the individual circumstances of the plaintiff or his workplace.”99
Thus, some lower courts, while ostensibly applying Burlington
Northern’s materiality standard are, in fact, establishing adverse
precedent for retaliation plaintiffs by ignoring a crucial facet of the
opinion.
The second noteworthy aspect of the decisions is that they sometimes
take an unrealistic view of what is likely to dissuade an employee from
complaining about unlawful discrimination. As Professor Sperino has
detailed, in recent years courts have held that a host of seemingly serious
forms of employer retaliation are not actionable. These include
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
Sperino, supra note 10, at 2033.
Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 69 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Sperino, supra note 10, at 2040 (citing Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 69).
See id. at 2058 (discussing the approach of lower courts).
Id. at 2060.
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threatening to fire the employee, providing negative evaluations or
disciplinary notices, threatening the employee with suspension or
discipline, and falsely reporting poor performance.100 Lower courts
increasingly expect employees to have little concern over the possibility
that they might, for example, receive a poor performance evaluation in
retaliation when deciding whether to complain about unlawful
discrimination.101 In reaching these kinds of conclusions, courts often
characterize the employer actions in question as the sorts of “petty slights,
minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” the Court identified
in Burlington Northern as not being actionable.102 Thus, one sees
decisions like one from a district court in Louisiana that concluded that
allegedly giving an employee a poor evaluation and subjecting the
employee to a seemingly constant barrage of retaliatory actions are the
sorts of “normal irritations and tribulations of the work place” that
employees should expect to endure when complaining about their
employers’ possibly illegal conduct.103
3.

Causation

Finally, lower courts have also used Supreme Court retaliation
decisions to tighten the causal connection requirement in retaliation cases.
a.

Mere Temporal Proximity

In Breeden, the Court held that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a
sufficient causal connection between her protected act of filing a
discrimination charge with the EEOC and the employer’s adverse action,
which occurred twenty months later.104 The Court noted that some lower
court decisions had accepted “mere temporal proximity between an
employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment
action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie

100. Id. at 2036.
101. See Wilson-Robinson v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 10-584, 2012 WL
5940912, at *5–7 (M.D. La. Nov. 27, 2012) (concluding that employer’s act of providing a rating of
“poor” on employee’s evaluation was not materially adverse).
102. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
103. Wilson-Robinson, 2012 WL 5940912, at *7. Most of the alleged retaliatory acts—such as
failing to send the plaintiff emails and meeting with the plaintiff on a weekly basis—seem fairly minor
standing alone. When stacked on top of each other, however, they begin to look more material. In
addition, others—such as changing the employee’s work schedule—are potentially more material
even standing alone. Id.
104. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001) (per curiam).
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case.”105 However, the decisions that relied solely on temporal proximity
“uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be ‘very close.’”106
Breeden’s use of the phrase “mere temporal proximity” has had a
significant impact in influencing lower courts. Prior to Breeden, that
phrase had been used in federal employment retaliation cases roughly
sixty times.107 Following Breeden, the phrase has been used over 1,900
times in federal decisions,108 typically in cases in which the plaintiff loses
on the causation issue.109 And when lower courts observe that a plaintiff
is relying upon “mere temporal proximity” in order to establish the causal
link, they now also almost invariably add that such proximity must be
“very close.”110 As applied by lower courts, the phrase “very close”
means, in fact, very close.111 Under the specific facts of a case, a gap of
one month between protected activity and adverse action has been held to
be too long.112 The Eighth Circuit has held that a gap of two weeks was
“sufficient, but barely so, to establish causation.”113 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that anything over ten days requires
supplemental evidence of causation.114

105. Id. at 273.
106. Id.
107. Using the search (retaliation & “mere temporal proximity” & DA(bef 4/23/2001))—to capture
cases before the day Breeden was decided—in the Federal Cases database in Westlaw yielded sixtytwo decisions as of April 13, 2018.
108. Using the search (retaliation & “mere temporal proximity” & DA(aft 4/23/2001)) in the
Federal Cases database in Westlaw yielded 1,976 decisions on April 13, 2018. Not all of these are
employment retaliation cases, but most are.
109. See, e.g., Penley v. McDowell Cty. Bd. of Educ., 876 F.3d 646, 656–57 (4th Cir. 2017)
(affirming summary judgment against employee); Townsend v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 3d 118,
132 (D.D.C. 2017) (dismissing retaliation claim).
110. Using the search (retaliation & “mere temporal proximity” /p “very close” & DA(aft
4/23/2001)) in the Federal Cases database in Westlaw yielded 1,223 decisions on April 13, 2018. Not
all of these are employment retaliation cases, but most are.
111. In one recent decision, a federal district court surveyed the decisional law and noted that
“[c]ourts have found seventeen days, fifteen days, and ten days to be sufficiently close to establish a
causal connection.” Crain v. Schlumberger Tech. Co., 187 F. Supp. 3d 732, 741–42 (E.D. La. 2016)
(footnotes omitted). Relying on this, the court found eleven days to be sufficiently close to establish
a prima facie case. Id.
112. Hardy v. Pepsi Bottling Co., No. 14-CV-4007 (VEC), 2016 WL 1301181, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2016); Wilson v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 4:15CV00466 SWW, 2015 WL 9244650,
at *4 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 15, 2015). But see Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 721 (2d Cir. 2002)
(holding that prima facie retaliation case was established where approximately one month had elapsed
between protected activity and adverse employment action).
113. Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2002).
114. Blakney v. City of Philadelphia, 559 F. App’x 183, 186 (3d Cir. 2014).
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Nassar and But-For Causation

The other Supreme Court decision that is starting to have a similar
limiting effect on the causation requirement is University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, decided in 2013. The case
presented the question of what causation standard Title VII employs. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had held below that a Title VII retaliation
plaintiff was only required to show that retaliation was a motivating factor
in the employer’s action. Thus, as long as the employer was motivated, at
least in part, to retaliate against the plaintiff for engaging in protected
conduct, the causation requirement was satisfied.115 On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that “Title VII retaliation claims must be proved
according to traditional principles of but-for causation.”116 This requires
proof on the plaintiff’s part “that the unlawful retaliation would not have
occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the
employer.”117
Nassar’s adoption of a but-for causation standard obviously subjects
Title VII retaliation plaintiffs to a heightened causation standard, thus
making it more difficult for retaliation plaintiffs to establish the requisite
causal link between protected conduct and an employer’s adverse
action.118 But the decision has had another effect on some lower court
decisions. Nassar has also caused some lower courts to reevaluate the
proposition that mere temporal proximity may ever establish causation.
There were some courts, prior to Nassar, that took the position that mere
temporal proximity could help establish the causation element of the
115. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524 (2013) (citing Nassar
v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2012)).
116. Id. at 2533.
117. Id. Nassar involved a Title VII retaliation claim. Not all statutes employ the same language
as Title VII, thus leaving open the question as to what causation standard applies under some of these
other statutes. See generally Nancy S. Modesitt, Causation in Whistleblowing Cases, 50 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1193 (2016) (discussing the various causation standards that exist under different statutes).
118. See Deborah L. Brake, Tortifying Retaliation: Protected Activity at the Intersection of Fault,
Duty, and Causation, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1375, 1377 (2014) (referring to the but-for standard as stricter
than the motivating factor standard); William R. Corbett, What Is Troubling About the Tortification
of Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027, 1029–30 (2014) (discussing the Court’s
rejection of less rigorous causation standards in employment cases and its adoption of a but-for
causation standard); Modesitt, supra note 117, at 1213 (discussing evidential problems plaintiffs face
under a but-for causation standard); Kate Webber, It Is Political: Using the Models of Judicial
Decision Making to Explain the Ideological History of Title VII, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 841, 854
(2015) (describing the motivating factor test as more lenient than the but-for test); Michael J. Zimmer,
Hiding the Statute in Plain View: University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 14
NEV. L.J. 705, 705 (2014) (“The obvious impact of Nassar is that it makes it more difficult for
plaintiffs to prove retaliation.”).
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plaintiff’s prima facie case but was insufficient, standing alone, to do
so.119 Since Nassar, several courts have taken the position that Nassar
forecloses the possibility that temporal proximity, standing alone, is
sufficient to establish causation.120 And others have at least questioned the
extent to which Nassar has changed the analysis and whether mere
temporal proximity can ever be sufficient to satisfy the but-for standard.121
Finally, Nassar may also have impact beyond Title VII retaliation
cases. Federal courts are currently grappling with whether the stricter butfor causation standard applies to retaliation cases brought under the
ADA.122 Nassar may also limit protection from retaliation at the state level
as state courts are likewise confronting how Nassar impacts the
interpretation of their own discrimination statutes that contain antiretaliation provisions.123

119. Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 549 (7th Cir. 2008).
120. See Shaninga v. St. Luke’s Med. Ctr. LP, No. CV-14-02475-PHX-GMS, 2016 WL 1408289,
at *11 (D. Ariz. Apr. 11, 2016); Montgomery v. Trs. of Univ. of Ala., No. 2:12–CV–2148–WMA,
2015 WL 1893471, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2015); Ellorin v. Applied Finishing, Inc., 996 F. Supp.
2d 1070, 1091 (W.D. Wash. 2014); Williams v. Serra Chevrolet Auto., LLC, 4 F. Supp. 3d 865, 879
(E.D. Mich. 2014).
121. See White v. Caterpillar Logistics, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 3d 713, 724 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (noting the
dispute among lower courts regarding the effect of Nassar, including the temporal proximity issue);
Taylor v. Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr., 3 F. Supp. 3d 462, 472 (D. Md. 2014) (stating court did not
believe that Nassar significantly impacts the causation analysis where plaintiff relies upon temporal
proximity); cases cited supra note 120. But see Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d
497, 505 (6th Cir. 2014) (restating post-Nassar that mere temporal proximity may be sufficient); Zann
Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 845 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he [Nassar] but-for causation
standard does not alter the plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate causation at the prima facie stage on
summary judgment or at trial indirectly through temporal proximity.”); Hubbard v. Ga. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 5:11–CV–290 (CAR), 2013 WL 3964908, at *2 (M.D. Ga. July 13, 2014)
(concluding that Nassar’s heightened but-for causation standard did not prevent plaintiff from raising
an issue of material fact regarding causation when the temporal proximity between protected conduct
and adverse action was “very close”); Pierce v. Universal Steel of N.C., LCC, No. 1:13CV158, 2014
WL 868858, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 5, 2014) (“[e]ven after Nassar, courts have adhered to [the] rule”
that temporal proximity may suffice).
122. Courts are currently split on this issue. Compare Gallagher v. San Diego Unified Port Dist.,
14 F. Supp. 3d 1380 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (applying Nassar), with Siring v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ.,
977 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062–63 (D. Or. 2013) (declining to apply Nassar).
123. See Gonska v. Highland View Manor, No. CV126030032S, 2014 WL 3893100, at *7 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 26, 2014) (declining to follow Nassar for purposes of interpreting state anti-retaliation
provision).

07 - Long.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

5/26/2018 5:27 PM

RETALIATION BACKLASH

737

III. A TALE OF TWO STATUTES: HOW THE STORY OF
RETALIATION LAW TRACKS THE STORY OF DISABILITY
LAW
In many ways, the story arc of modern retaliation law tracks the story
arc of modern disability law. In both cases, a period of initial optimism
regarding the ability of the relevant federal statutes to effectuate positive
change eventually gave way to a judicial backlash that limited the reach
of the laws. The following Part explores the similarities between the two
areas of law and offers some explanations as to the source of judicial
backlash in both cases.
A.

The Americans with Disabilities Act: Promise, Backlash, and
Legislative Intervention

As this Article posits, the story regarding the evolution of the law
regarding disability discrimination closely parallels that of the evolution
of the law regarding workplace retaliation. Therefore, it is first necessary
to briefly tell the story of the rise, fall, and rebirth of the ADA.
1.

High Hopes

The ADA was enacted in 1990 with the goal of providing equality of
opportunity for individuals with disabilities.124 Under the employment
provisions of the Act, an employer is prohibited from discriminating
against a qualified individual with a disability.125 Importantly, the term
“discrimination” includes not only traditional forms of discrimination but
also the failure to make reasonable accommodations.126 Thus, employers
are required under the ADA to make reasonable modifications to their
workplaces and practices to enable individuals with disabilities to enjoy
equal opportunity in the workplace.
Prior to its passage, individuals with disabilities were protected from
discrimination through a hodgepodge of state and federal statutes that
provided only limited protection.127 The most significant of these laws

124. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)(8), 104 Stat. 327, 329
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2012)).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
126. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
127. See Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent Interpretations of
State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 477–78 (2006)
(describing the statutory scheme providing protection from disability discrimination at the time of the
ADA’s enactment).
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was section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act.128 As enacted, section
504 provided that “[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”129
Because section 504 only reached discrimination by federal
government actors and those receiving federal financial assistance, the
scope of the statute was somewhat limited.130 There were relatively few
judicial decisions interpreting section 504’s “otherwise qualified
handicapped individual” (later re-termed “disability”) language prior to
the ADA’s passage.131 Despite the relative lack of decisional law, the
prevailing narrative has long been that federal courts rarely stopped to
question whether an individual had a “disability” for purposes of the
Act.132 Instead, the primary focus was on whether the individual with the
disability was “qualified.” While there was the occasional outlier case in

128. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)).
129. Id.
130. Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court
Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 535 (2008)
(referring to the Act as a “very modest” statute).
131. Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 631 (1999); see
also Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer’s Financial
Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 433
(1995).
132. See, e.g., Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can
and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 233 (2010) (“With a few
exceptions, courts considered anyone alleging discrimination based on an impairment to be
‘disabled.’”); Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities,
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 301–02
(2000) (discussing plaintiffs’ success on this issue and stating “Congress had no reason to believe
when it passed the ADA that the courts would closely scrutinize” the question of whether an
individual had a disability); Hillary K. Valderrama, Is the ADAAA a “Quick Fix” or Are We Out of
the Frying Pan and into the Fire: How Requiring Parties to Participate in the Interactive Process
Can Effect Congressional Intent Under the ADAAA, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 175, 192 (2010) (stating “the
courts had generally interpreted the definition in favor of plaintiffs”).
Professor Chai Feldblum, one of the original authors of the ADA, has provided this account of the
pre-ADA caselaw:
Courts deciding cases under that definition had decided that individuals with a wide range of
serious medical conditions could invoke the protections of the law. Indeed, courts had rarely
even parsed the language of the definition to decide whether a plaintiff was a “handicapped
individual” under the law. Rather, the definition was understood to include any medical
condition that was non-trivial, and the courts had applied the law’s coverage in that manner.
Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 91–92 (2000).
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which a defendant successfully challenged the existence of a disability,
the narrative surrounding section 504 has been that courts generally took
a liberal view of the definition of disability. As such, disability rights
advocates were optimistic that the statute provided a solid working model
when they began drafting what would become the ADA.133
Any concerns that disability rights advocates might have had about the
ability of the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of disability to serve as a
model for the ADA were apparently alleviated by the Supreme Court’s
decision in 1989 in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,134
however.135 In Arline, the Supreme Court gave an expansive reading to
the terms in the Act’s definition of disability.136 Indeed, the Court spent
relatively little time focusing on the statutory definition and instead
focused heavily on the purposes underlying the statute.137 So, when
disability rights advocates began work on the ADA and used the
133. See Feldblum, supra note 132, at 113 (describing the false sense of security disability rights
advocates had at the time). The reality of section 504’s effectiveness as a model for defining the
concept of “disability” was actually more complicated. In some instances, defendants simply did not
challenge the existence of a disability in section 504 cases. See id. at 108, 138 (stating it was rare for
courts to question whether a plaintiff had a disability and that lawyers increasingly focused on this
issue following passage of the ADA). As section 504 decisional law developed over time, more
decisions emerged in which plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the threshold question of whether a
disability existed under the statute. In 1984, a federal court stated that there was only one decision in
which a court concluded that a plaintiff was unable to establish the existence of a disability. Tudyman
v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 745–46 (C.D. Cal. 1984). In fact, there were others. See Stevens
v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088,
1092 (D. Haw. 1980). As the decade progressed, more plaintiffs lost on this issue. Forrisi v. Bowen,
794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986); Oesterling v. Walters, 760 F.2d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1985); Fuqua
v. Unisys Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1201, 1205–07 (D. Minn. 1989); Elstner v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 659 F.
Supp. 1328, 1342–43 (S.D. Tex. 1987); Pridemore v. Legal Aid Soc’y of Dayton, 625 F. Supp. 1171,
1175 (S.D. Ohio 1985). In these cases, courts began to parse the definition of disability found in the
statute and apply it with a certain amount of rigor. See Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 934 (noting the “limiting
adjectives” in the statutory definition of disability and concluding that the Act protects only the “truly
disabled”). For disability rights advocates who were paying attention, there were certainly warning
signs that the statutory text of section 504’s definition of disability potentially posed some problems
for future plaintiffs. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability,
42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 432 (1997) (noting that the Rehabilitation Act’s first definition of disability is
“worded in restrictive terms”).
134. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
135. See Feldblum, supra note 132, at 92 (stating that “there seemed to be little legal need to change
the definition of ‘disability’ for the ADA” following Arline).
136. See Selmi, supra note 130, at 537 (discussing the expansive approach of Arline).
137. Arline, 480 U.S. at 281–82; see Feldblum, supra note 132, at 118 (noting that “[t]he Court did
not engage at any length with the statutory definition of ‘handicapped individual’” and that “the
simplicity and breeziness with which the Supreme Court” dealt with the text “is almost breathtaking
in its naivete” compared to subsequent decisions); Long, supra note 48, at 543 (arguing that the Court
glossed over the statutory definition).
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Rehabilitation Act as the model for the new legislation, they did so with
the belief that future courts would take a similarly expansive view of the
ADA.138 They would soon learn how mistaken they were.
2.

Judicial Backlash

The ADA was enacted in 1990 with great fanfare.139 In addition to
addressing discrimination at hotels, restaurants, and other places of public
accommodation, the Act expanded the statutory protection against
disability discrimination to the private employment sector.140 Congress
estimated at the time that there were over 43 million Americans with a
disability.141 In light of the fact that the new law would cover private
workplaces, it was easy to foresee that there would be far more cases
brought under the ADA than had been brought under the Rehabilitation
Act. Indeed, within the first two years of the ADA’s existence, there were
over 30,000 charges of employment discrimination filed with the
EEOC.142 In contrast, there had only been a total of 265 lawsuits filed
under the Rehabilitation Act when the ADA was enacted, and those suits
covered not just employment discrimination but also education, housing,
and other forms of discrimination.143
As the decisional law under the ADA developed in the 1990s, disability
rights advocates became alarmed over the increased attention that
defendants and courts were paying to the preliminary question of whether
a plaintiff had a disability.144 ADA plaintiffs increasingly found
themselves having to satisfy the preliminary question of whether they had
disabilities. And as courts increasingly turned their attention to the
statutory definition of “disability,” ADA plaintiffs increasingly
encountered greater difficulties meeting the statutory definition.145

138. See Selmi, supra note 130, at 537 (explaining that Arline “almost certainly sealed the
subsequent decision to incorporate the Rehab Act’s definition into the ADA”).
139. See Bradley A. Areheart, Accommodating Pregnancy, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1145 n.129
(2015) (noting that sponsors of the Act referred to it at the time as the “‘emancipation proclamation’
for people with disabilities”); Stefan, supra note 132, at 271 (describing the optimism surrounding
enactment of the Act).
140. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101–07, 302(a), 104 Stat.
327, 330–37, 355 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17, 12182(a) (2012)).
141. Id. § 2(a)(1), 104 Stat. at 328.
142. Epstein, supra note 131, at 433–34.
143. Id.
144. Feldblum, supra note 132, at 139.
145. Id. at 138–39.
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In 1999, the Supreme Court formalized the narrow view of the concept
of a “disability” under the ADA through a trilogy of decisions that
dramatically narrowed the scope of the statute.146 Adopting a narrow
approach to the terms in the statutory definition, the Court held that an
individual’s use of mitigating measures to compensate for the effects of
an impairment—such as eyeglass, prescription medication, or even the
individual’s own unconscious attempts to adapt to an impairment—must
be taken into account when determining whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity.147 In addition, the Court took
a narrow view of what it means to be substantially limited in the major
life activity of working, concluding that one must be precluded from a
class of jobs or broad range of jobs.148 In 2002, the Court followed up with
an explicit statement that the terms in the ADA’s definition of disability
need to be interpreted strictly “to create a demanding standard for
qualifying as disabled.”149
As these decisions filtered down to the lower courts, the situation
became fairly grim for ADA plaintiffs. Physical and mental impairments
that disability rights supporters had long assumed would always qualify
as disabilities—such as multiple sclerosis,150 cancer,151 HIV infection,152
cerebral palsy,153 and bipolar disorder154—were increasingly held by
courts not to qualify.155 Studies soon consistently revealed astonishingly
low success rates for ADA plaintiffs.156 In the vast majority of reported
decisions, ADA plaintiffs were unable to clear the initial hurdle of
establishing the existence of a disability157—the legal issue disability
146. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
147. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 566.
148. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493.
149. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
150. Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 194 F.3d 1084, 1085 (10th Cir. 1999).
151. Hirsch v. Nat’l Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977, 980–82 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
152. Blanks v. Sw. Bell Commc’ns, Inc., 310 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002).
153. Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 766–67 (10th Cir. 2006).
154. Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
155. See Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act:
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217 (2008)
(discussing coverage issues under the ADA).
156. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 108 (1999) (relating details of study showing plaintiffs lost 94% of cases at the
trial court level between 1992 and 1998).
157. See Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213,
1215 (2003) (citing study reporting low plaintiff success rates and attributing much of the failure to
the inability of plaintiffs to satisfy the ADA’s definition of disability).
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rights advocates, based on earlier decisions, had assumed would rarely
even be at issue.158 In short, all of the initial excitement that accompanied
the ADA eventually gave way to the sense that the federal courts had
effectively gutted the statute.
3.

A New Beginning, a New Backlash

Ultimately, the perceived ADA backlash from courts led to a backlash
from Congress. In 2008, Congress amended the ADA, focusing almost
exclusively on the definition of disability. In the Findings and Purposes
accompanying the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), Congress
expressly disapproved of the Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretations
of the terms in the ADA’s definition of disability.159 The ADAAA
substantially broadened the definition of disability, thus providing
significantly greater coverage for individuals with a variety of physical
and mental impairments.
Despite Congress’s intervention, there remain concerns that lower
courts continue to unduly limit the reach of the statute. The new definition
of “disability” is expansive enough, and the accompanying Findings and
Purposes specific enough, that plaintiffs now face less difficulty in
establishing the existence of a disability.160 However, as Professor
Michelle A. Travis has suggested, lower courts have found new ways to
“avoid the difficult questions of accommodation.”161 To be protected
under the Act, it is not enough that one simply have a disability. To be
protected and to be entitled to a reasonable accommodation, one must be
qualified. To be qualified, one must be capable of performing the essential

158. See supra notes 124–32 and accompanying text.
159. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2, 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–56.
160. See Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2051, 2057–58 (2013) (finding improved success
rate for ADA plaintiffs in federal courts on threshold issue of disability); Nicole Buonocore Porter,
The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2014) (“[A]nyone who has studied disability
law cases can easily ascertain a clear distinction between pre-ADAAA cases, where courts went out
of their way to find that various impairments were not disabilities, and post-ADAAA cases, where at
least some courts seem to be bending over backward to find individuals disabled (or at least allow
those plaintiffs to survive summary judgment on the issue).”); Michelle A. Travis, Disqualifying
Universality Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1689, 1694 (stating
“the ADAAA largely eliminated courts’ ability to use disability status as the law’s gatekeeper”).
161. See Travis, supra note 160, at 1695.
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functions of a position, with or without reasonable accommodation.162 The
ADAAA did not amend this portion of the ADA.163
Rather than relying upon the “disability” as the gatekeeper to coverage
under the ADA, courts now seem to be relying upon the “qualified”
language as the gatekeeper and, in particular, the “essential functions”
portion of that language.164 The EEOC regulations and Interpretive
Guidance accompanying the ADA describe the essential functions of a
job in terms of the duties of the job, such as typing, proofreading, or
operating a cash register.165 In her study of post-ADAAA federal court
decisions, Professor Nicole Buonocore Porter observed that rather than
limiting the “essential function” concept to actual job duties or tasks,
courts frequently treat various workplace norms—such as working a
rotating shift or working certain hours—as essential functions. For
example, in a workplace where the ability to work the day or night shift
was a norm, an employee who could not work the night shift due to a
disability was held not to be able to perform the essential function of the
position.166 And as an employer is not required to eliminate an essential
function of a position under the ADA, courts often hold that the individual
is not qualified and is thus not entitled to the protection of the ADA.167
Professor Michelle Travis has also noted the tendency of courts to
mischaracterize an employer’s qualification standards as essential job
functions.168 According to the EEOC, the phrase “qualification standards”
refers to the personal and professional attributes of an employee, such as
“skill, experience, education,” etc., that the employer establishes as
requirements for a position.169 The definition is significant because the
ADA prohibits an employer from utilizing qualification standards that
screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class
of individuals unless the employer can show that the standard is job

162. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012).
163. See Long, supra note 155, at 228–29 (noting the failure of Congress to amend the reasonable
accommodation portion of the statute).
164. See Travis, supra note 160, at 1697 (explaining that “the qualification requirement is being
used to replace disability status as the new gatekeeper for ADA protection” and that “the ‘essential
functions’ component of the qualifications test has become the critical source for undermining the
ADAAA”).
165. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (2017); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n).
166. See Porter, supra note 160, at 74 (citing Tucker v. Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 2:11-CV04134-NKL, 2012 WL 6115604, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 10, 2012)).
167. See id. at 70 (citing cases).
168. Travis, supra note 160, at 1721.
169. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q).
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related and consistent with business necessity.170 Thus, the employer bears
the burden of establishing the need for a particular qualification standard
under the strict business necessity standard. In contrast, because the ADA
only protects qualified individuals with disabilities, the employee bears
the burden of establishing either that a job function is not essential or that
the employee can perform the function in order to establish that the
employee is qualified. As Professor Travis has noted, after the passage of
the ADAAA, employer groups began encouraging employers to list things
like education and experience requirements—which clearly fall under the
category of qualification standards that need to be affirmatively justified
by the employer on business necessity grounds—as essential job functions
in their job descriptions.171 Some courts have gone along with these kinds
of mischaracterizations, with the result being that an employee who lacks
the education or experience requirements established by an employer is
deemed by the court unable to perform the essential functions of a position
and, hence, not a qualified individual.
On the one hand, these results are not terribly surprising. EEOC
Interpretive Guidance and longstanding judicial precedent both
emphasize the idea of preserving employer discretion surrounding which
job functions should be deemed essential.172 At the same time, these kinds
of decisions are flatly inconsistent with the language of the Act and the
regulations. By mischaracterizing workplace structural norms and
qualification standards as essential functions, courts make it significantly
more difficult for plaintiffs to establish that they are qualified under the
ADA.
B.

Explanations for the ADA Backlash

So what caused the original raft of restrictive holdings regarding the
ADA’s definition of disability and the more recent restrictive
interpretations of the essential function concept among federal courts?
One explanation might be that the restrictive decisions under the ADA
simply reflect the proper or at least a better interpretation of the ADA’s

170. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012).
171. Travis, supra note 160, at 1723.
172. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n) (explaining that the inquiry into whether a function is essential
“is not intended to second guess an employer’s business judgment with regard to productions
standards”); Travis, supra note 160, at 1701 (discussing pre-ADAAA court deference to an
employer’s definition of “essential functions” if listed as part of a job description before litigation).
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text than the earlier decisions under the Rehabilitation Act. While
plausible on its face, this explanation is not completely satisfying.173
Under the ADA’s original definition of disability, a plaintiff needed to
establish the existence of a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limited one or more major life activities, a record of such an
impairment, or that the employer regarded the plaintiff as having such an
impairment.174 To be sure, some of the earlier decisions under the
Rehabilitation Act tended to gloss over the adverb “substantially” and the
adjective “major” in that definition.175 But the fact that those terms appear
in the definition of disability is only evidence of the inherently ambiguous
nature of the definition. There is no self-evident meaning of the terms
“substantially limits” and “major life activities.” This ambiguity provided
courts with substantial leeway when interpreting those terms.
It would hardly be a stretch, for example, to conclude that one who can
only see out of one eye is substantially limited in the major life activity of
seeing, regardless of any sort of unconscious, physiological coping
mechanisms one may employ to correct for the results of the impairment.
Moreover, a resort to the legislative history accompanying the ADA and
other tools of statutory construction might have easily led a court to the
conclusion that this sort of impairment should qualify as an actual
disability or at least that individuals with such impairments who faced
adverse actions from their employers were regarded by their employers as
having such impairments.176 The ADA’s legislative history cited Arline
and similar decisional law under the Rehabilitation Act extensively and
indicated that courts should take a similarly expansive approach regarding
the interpretation of the ADA’s definition of disability.177 Yet in
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,178 the Supreme Court held that an
individual who could see out of only eye was not necessarily substantially
limited in the major life activity of seeing.179 Subsequent lower court
173. See Kevin M. Barry, Exactly What Congress Intended?, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 5, 10–
14 (2013) (discussing text-based arguments against the Court’s holdings).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
175. See, e.g., Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418, 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(concluding that plaintiff, who was missing a kidney but whose other kidney fully compensated for
loss, was entitled to relief).
176. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 499–503 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing legislative history undermining majority opinion in Sutton).
177. See Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119,
1139 n.83 (2010) (noting that references to Arline are “sprinkled throughout the ADA legislative
history”); Feldblum, supra note 132, at 130–32 (discussing Arline’s role in the legislative history).
178. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
179. Id. at 567.
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decisions found that similarly situated individuals were not substantially
limited in the major life activity of seeing.180
Despite the obvious ambiguity in the terms “substantially limited” and
“major life activities,” the Supreme Court eschewed any need to resort to
legislative history, explaining that the statutory text was clear and
compelled, in the Supreme Court’s words, the creation of a “demanding
standard” for qualifying as having a disability.181 Thus, in the face of
ambiguous statutory language, legislative history suggesting an expansive
approach, and decisional law taking the completely opposite approach,
one can hardly be blamed for believing that courts were influenced by
something more than mere statutory text.
Dismayed commentators devoted considerable time and effort to
exploring what they perceived to be the “ADA backlash” or “disability
backlash” from the courts. Commentators offered various explanations for
the perceived judicial hostility to the ADA’s definition of disability.
According to some, the problem was that many judges failed to grasp the
ADA’s reliance on a civil rights model for addressing disability
discrimination and instead viewed the Act as bestowing special benefits
for people with disabilities.182 Under this theory, courts viewed the ADA’s
reasonable accommodation requirement as a requirement that employers
provide preferential treatment to people with physical or mental
impairments. Bothered by that idea, courts sought to limit the number of
potential claimants.183 Closely related to this explanation was the
explanation that courts were frustrated by the dramatic increase in the
number of cases coming onto their dockets that involved what they
perceived to be relatively trivial issues.184 Facing an increase in the
180. See, e.g., Flores v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292–93 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Rivera
v. Apple Indus. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 202, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
181. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
182. Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 23–24 (2000).
183. See Porter, supra note 160, at 5 (2014).
184. See Stephen F. Befort, Let’s Try This Again: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to
Reinvigorate the “Regarded as” Prong of the Statutory Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV.
993, 1000 (“Perhaps as a partial response to the burdens of this growing caseload, federal court
decisions began to adopt a more restrictive view of the ADA’s disability definition.”). Befort cites as
an example a sentence in an ADA decision from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in which the
court expressed frustration that the ADA “had the potential of being the greatest generator of litigation
ever, and that the court doubted whether Congress, in its wildest dreams or wildest nightmares,
intended to turn every garden variety worker’s compensation claim into a federal case.” Id. at 1000
n.56 (quoting Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., 891 F. Supp. 482, 485 (W.D. Ark. 1994), rev’d, 60 F.3d 1300
(8th Cir. 1995)); see also Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 369 (1997)
(noting that over 80,000 charges of employment discrimination with the EEOC in the five years the
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number of claims from individuals whom they have viewed as seeking
special treatment, skeptical courts were attempting to narrow the scope of
the statute so that it only protected those who, in the courts’ view, were
“truly disabled.”185
The final explanation incorporates some of these same ideas but offers
a slight twist. The question of whether an individual with a disability is
qualified requires a court to consider whether the individual can perform
the essential functions of a position with a reasonable accommodation. In
turn, the question of whether a proposed accommodation is reasonable
requires courts to delve into the minutiae of the workplace and to evaluate
the discretionary decisions as to that minutiae.186 Therefore, one
explanation for the disability backlash is that courts were anxious to avoid
engaging in this type of hard look and instead chose to focus heavily on
the preliminary question of whether an individual has a disability. In other
words, a strict reading of the definition of disability served, in the words
of Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Justin Nelson, as “a gatekeeping
mechanism” that allowed courts to avoid thorny questions concerning the
reasonable accommodation concept.187 Indeed, in his dissenting opinion
in Sutton, Justice Stevens expressed a similar view, suggesting that the
majority’s restrictive interpretation of the ADA’s definition of disability
was based, in part, on “a concern that their decision will legalize issues
best left to the private sphere.”188 In short, by adopting a strict interpretive
approach to the definition of disability, courts could avoid being in the
position of having to second-guess employer decision-making concerning
the day-to-day operations of the workplace.
The very nature of the reasonable accommodation requirement impacts
employers’ discretion as to how to structure their workplaces in a way that
other anti-discrimination statutes do not. Under traditional antidiscrimination statutes, employers are simply prohibited from taking into

statute became effective); Diller, supra note 182, at 50 (suggesting federal courts viewed the ADA as
an example of the type of statute “that clutter[s] up the dockets of federal courts”).
185. Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
186. Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[N]othing in the
law leads us to conclude that in enacting the disability acts, Congress intended to interfere with
personnel decisions within an organizational hierarchy.”); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Justin
Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the
Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 336–37 (2001) (noting that the analysis of
whether an individual is qualified may require a court “to delve into the factual minutia of each
individual case”).
187. Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 186, at 321.
188. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 513 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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account race, sex, or other factors in their decisions.189 In contrast, it is
discrimination under the ADA for an employer to fail to make reasonable
modifications to the employer’s policies and practices in the case of an
individual with a disability.190 Thus, it may be reasonable under the
circumstances for an employee to demand that the employer allow the
employee to begin the work day earlier or later than scheduled,191 to work
on a part-time basis instead of a full-time basis,192 to work from home,193
to require a supervisor to provide more detailed instructions or to
otherwise alter her supervisory style,194 to make an exception to an
existing leave policy,195 or to make an exception to an existing seniority
system.196 In short, the reasonable accommodation requirement is
sweeping in its scope in that it potentially impacts virtually all employerestablished workplace policies and practices.197
This theory also best explains the courts’ mishandling of the ADA’s
essential function concept. By misclassifying certain workplace structural
norms—such as the ability to work a rotating shift—as essential functions
of a position that an employer is not required to waive, courts are able to
avoid having to question an employer’s judgment as to why such a waiver
would not be a reasonable accommodation. Likewise, by misclassifying
educational requirements and the like as essential functions, courts are
189. To the extent a statute prohibits an employer from employing a neutral practice that has a
disparate impact on a particular group, the ADA is similar. See EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227
F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting the similarity).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
191. See id. § 12111(9)(B) (listing modified work schedules as a reasonable accommodation).
192. Id. (listing part-time work schedules as a reasonable accommodation).
193. See Core v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 3:11-cv-166(TSB), 2012 WL 3073418,
at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 30, 2012) (recognizing that working from home can potentially be a reasonable
accommodation).
194. See Kravits v. Shinseki, No. CIV.A. 10-861(GLL), 2012 WL 604169, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb.
24, 2012) (concluding a triable issue existed as to whether requiring employer to provide more
detailed instructions was a reasonable accommodation); Bennett v. Unisys Corp., No. 2:99-CV0446(FVA), 2000 WL 33126583, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2000) (holding that adjusting supervisory
methods could potentially be a reasonable accommodation); Alex B. Long, Reasonable
Accommodation as Professional Responsibility, Reasonable Accommodation as Professionalism, 47
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1753, 1762 (2014) (discussing the reluctance of employers to make these types
of accommodations).
195. See Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 647–48 (1st Cir. 2000)
(recognizing that permitting an employee to extend her medical leave beyond that allowed under the
company’s own policy could be a reasonable accommodation).
196. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403 (2002).
197. See id. at 418 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing decision and stating that as a result of the
decision, “all workplace rules are eligible to be used as vehicles of accommodation” (emphasis in
original)).
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able to avoid delving into the minutiae of the workplace and potentially
placing themselves in a position where they might have to second-guess
an employer’s decisions.
Of course, the ADA and its accompanying regulations go to
considerable lengths not to unduly impact employer discretion.198 But
courts have nonetheless frequently expressed concern over secondguessing employers regarding their decisions about whether to provide an
employee’s requested accommodation.199 Thus, one of the more
compelling explanations for why courts took such a strict approach to
defining the concept of “disability” under the ADA is that they realized
that if they did not do so, they would be compelled to more often dig deep
into the minutiae of an individual workplace and second-guess an
employer’s refusal to provide an employee’s requested accommodation.
C.

Similarities Between the History of the ADA and the History of
Retaliation Law

There are numerous similarities in terms of the narratives surrounding
the ADA and retaliation law. In both fields, early successes gave rise to
misplaced optimism. And in both fields, initial optimism eventually gave
way to judicial backlash. The following section examines the similarities
in more detail and offers some additional explanation as to the source of
the judicial backlash in the case of employment retaliation law.

198. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the deference given to employer
discretion regarding which functions are essential).
199. See Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 358 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the ability to rotate
shifts was an essential function of position and stating that “[i]t is not the province of the court to
question the legitimate operation of a production facility or determine what is the most productive or
efficient shift schedule for a facility”); Kaitschuck v. Doc’s Drugs, Ltd., No. 13-C-1985, 2014 WL
1478017, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2014) (refusing to require employer to waive its certification
requirement for eligibility for a job on the grounds that the court does not “sit as a kind of superpersonnel department” (quoting Magnus v. St. Mark United Methodist Church, 688 F.3d 331, 338–
39 (7th Cir. 2012)); EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11-13742, 2012 WL 3945540, at *5 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 10, 2012) (declining to “second-guess” employer’s business judgment regarding whether it was
essential for employee to be present at the office); Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d
1094, 1104 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (deferring to employer’s judgment that the ability to drive a ready-mix
truck in an emergency was an essential function that employer was not required to waive and stating
“it is not its position to question the soundness of Crown’s business judgments”); Lewis v. Zilog, Inc.,
908 F. Supp. 931, 948 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (“Forcing transfers of employees under the guise of reasonably
accommodating employees under the ADA inherently would undermine an employer’s ability to
control its own labor force.”).
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1.

Initial Successes Mask Pitfalls of Statutory Language: The
Histories of the ADA and Retaliation Law

a.

Initial Successes Mask Pitfalls of Statutory Language: The ADA

In both areas, the initial success that plaintiffs enjoyed masked
underlying areas of concern inherent in the relevant statutory language. In
the ADA context, disability rights advocates were lulled into a false sense
of security by generally favorable decisional law under the Rehabilitation
Act.200 This sense of security reached its peak with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Arline, in which the Court spent little time parsing the statutory
definition of definition and gave an expansive reading to the statute.201
One explanation for the inability of disability rights advocates to
predict the subsequent string of pro-defendant decisions lies in the
changing approach to statutory interpretation that took place during this
period. Looked at through the lens of the textualist approach that
dominates modern statutory interpretation, the text of the ADA’s original
definition of disability seems anything but pro-plaintiff. To establish the
existence of an actual disability, a plaintiff was required to establish the
existence of an impairment that substantially limited a major life
activity.202 The modifying words “substantially” and “major” potentially
imposed a not-insignificant burden on a plaintiff. And while the two
alternate definitions permitted a plaintiff to qualify as disabled by
establishing a record of such an impairment, or that the defendant
regarded the plaintiff as having such an impairment, those definitions also
utilized the same modifying terms.203 In hindsight, the potential
deficiencies of the definition from a plaintiff’s perspective should have
been obvious.
Why, then, were they not? Part of the explanation has to do with the
fact that the ADA was born at the same time that textualism was becoming
the dominant approach to statutory interpretation.204 In the 1970s and ‘80s,
when courts were reviewing the language of the Rehabilitation Act that
served as the basis for the ADA’s definition, textualism was not the force
200. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012).
203. Id.
204. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30, 30 n.125
(2006) (discussing how textualism began to displace purposivism during the 1980s and 1990s); Jarrod
Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM.
L. REV. 807, 852 (2014) (stating that the shift toward textualism began in the 1980s but accelerated
through the 1990s).
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it would soon become. Instead, courts were more willing to look to the
underlying purposes of a statute in construing the language. But by the
time the ADA went into effect in 1992, textualism was ascending.205
Reviewing courts in the 1990s were simply less inclined to look to the
purposes underlying the ADA’s statutory text rather than to focus on the
text itself. In addition, while the ADA was more dense and more specific
in terms of its text than older statutes like Title VII, it still contained a
great deal of ambiguous language.206 Thus, it took textualism to expose
some of the inherent limitations in the ADA’s definition of disability.
A related explanation has to do with the fact that the number of
disability discrimination cases exploded with the birth of the ADA. Prior
to the ADA, disability discrimination cases in the workplace were fairly
rare. Once private employers became subject to the requirements of the
ADA, the number of discrimination cases naturally increased. The result
was an increased attention to the language of this strange new law, which
led to defense attorneys, for the first time, advancing text-based arguments
in support of the argument that a plaintiff did not have a disability.207
Ultimately, it took an increase in the number of disability discrimination
cases and a hard look at the statutory definition of disability to expose
some of the flaws in the ADA.
b.

Initial Successes Mask Pitfalls of Statutory Language: Retaliation
Law

The story of the courts’ treatment of retaliation plaintiffs follows the
same pattern: early successes masked significant statutory shortcomings.
Prior to Nassar, most of the Supreme Court’s retaliation decisions
involved (1) basic threshold questions involving only a fairly limited
number of potential plaintiffs, such as whether former employees have a
claim under Title VII,208 whether a friend or relative of the party opposing
unlawful conduct has a claim under Title VII,209 and whether a particular

205. See Molot, supra note 204, at 30, 30 n.125 (discussing the rise of textualism around this time).
206. Justice O’Connor was once quoted as saying that the ADA is “an example of what happens
when the sponsors are so eager to get something passed that what passes hasn’t been as carefully
written as a group of law professors might put together. So it leaves lots of ambiguities and gaps and
things for courts to figure out.” William C. Smith, Drawing Boundaries, 88 A.B.A. J. 49, 49 (2002).
207. Chai Feldblum, one of the original authors of the ADA, tells the story of conducting seminars
in front of lawyers who were learning about the ADA for the first time shortly before the law went
into effect. These lawyers, knowing nothing about the prior history of the Rehabilitation Act case law,
focused heavily on the plain language of the statute. Feldblum, supra note 132, at 138–39.
208. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
209. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011).
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statute provides for a retaliation cause of action to begin with;210 or (2)
interpretive issues so confined to the statute in question that they were
unlikely to have broader application, such as whether a plaintiff who made
an oral complaint regarding unlawful discrimination under the Fair Labor
Standards Act had a retaliation claim.211 Thus, while these were all
victories for retaliation plaintiffs, they were victories of somewhat limited
precedential value.
The Supreme Court’s retaliation decisions reflect a strong emphasis on
textualist analysis; reliance on the purposes underlying the text is typically
of secondary importance in the opinions.212 As was the case before it with
the ADA, the statutory text of anti-retaliation provisions is often not as
plaintiff-friendly as early retaliation decisions might have led some to
believe. Supreme Court decisions affording retaliation plaintiffs victories
have tended to be based so strongly on textual grounds that they are of
limited value for retaliation plaintiffs outside of those narrow
circumstances. And it was not until the number of retaliation actions
increased and lower courts were forced to deal with the Supreme Court’s
rulings that the limitations of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions were
fully exposed.
The Court’s decision in Crawford—a case generally perceived as a win
for employees—provides an example. In Crawford, the Supreme Court
held that an employee who participated in an employer’s internal
investigation into alleged discrimination and provided “ostensibly
disapproving” testimony was protected by the opposition clause of Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision.213 While a win for future retaliation
plaintiffs in the sense that the Court concluded that the employee’s
conduct was protected even though it did not fit the classic form of
“retaliation” one ordinarily thinks of, the Court’s decision was not as
protective of employees as one might assume. Title VII’s participation
clause, unlike the opposition clause, does not impose any sort of good
faith or reasonableness standard upon an employee seeking its
protection.214 Thus, the protection afforded by the participation clause is
virtually absolute. The statutory text of both clauses actually imposed at
least some obstacles to classifying the plaintiff’s conduct as fitting under
210. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008); CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442
(2008); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
211. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011).
212. See Long, supra note 48, at 541 (“Textualism has won the war with respect to the
interpretation of statutory antiretaliation provisions.”).
213. See supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text.
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either clause. Had the Court concluded that the Crawford plaintiff’s
conduct fit within the protections of Title VII’s participation clause, future
employees who participate in internal investigations into discrimination
would not have been forced to establish that they reasonably believed they
were addressing unlawful conduct or that they acted in good faith.215
Instead, they would have been entitled to the absolute protection of the
participation clause.216
There are other examples of how the Court’s textualist approach to the
interpretation of anti-retaliation provisions has limited the protection
afforded to retaliation plaintiffs. In Thompson, the Court held that an
individual who suffers an adverse action due to a coworker’s protected
activity is an “aggrieved person” under Title VII who is entitled to a
statutory remedy.217 While certainly a victory for retaliation plaintiffs, it
is a win of limited value for the victims of retaliation who proceed under
other statutes. The Court’s decision was premised not on the grounds that
the aggrieved person was entitled to any sort of derivative right stemming
from the protected activity of the coworker but instead from a separate
provision in Title VII affording a remedy to anyone aggrieved by an
employer’s unlawful retaliation.218 While some other federal employment
statutes contain this same “aggrieved person” language, others do not.219
Thus, Thompson is hardly a broad pronouncement regarding the evils of
third-party retaliation and is instead a quite narrow opinion in which—
fortunately for the plaintiff in question—the text of the statute provided a
way for the court to address the obvious unjustness of permitting an
employer to take action against an innocent third party while still toeing
the textualist line.
2.

Concern over Intrusions into Employer Discretion: The Histories
of the ADA and Retaliation Law

The recent histories of disability law and retaliation law are also similar
in terms of how the courts have viewed the relevant statutes as intruding
upon employer discretion. With the ADA, courts could easily foresee that
the statute—with its requirement that an employer provide a reasonable
accommodation to a qualified individual with a disability—impacted
215. See supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text.
217. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 177–78 (2011).
218. Id. at 175; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012).
219. For example, the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
(USERRA) does not contain such a provision. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4322(a), 4323(d) (2012).
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employer discretion in meaningful ways.220 And with the statute’s
potential coverage of an estimated 43 million Americans, courts could
also foresee themselves frequently being dragged into the legal battles
over workplace minutiae.
The same fears perhaps explain the tendency of the Supreme Court and
lower courts to adopt narrow readings and applications of anti-retaliation
provisions. In some instances, the text of anti-retaliation provisions might
plausibly be read to produce a plaintiff-friendly result but perhaps more
easily could be read in a narrower fashion. In these situations, the Supreme
Court has more often chosen the narrower option. And when presented
with the opportunity to apply Supreme Court retaliation precedent in a
manner that would further the purposes underlying statutory antiretaliation provisions, lower courts have increasingly applied that
precedent in a highly restrictive manner.
Perhaps the clearest example of the Court’s tendency to choose the
narrower reading as between two plausible readings of statutory text is the
Court’s 2013 decision in Nassar. Title VII prohibits an employer from
retaliating against an individual “because” that individual engaged in
protected activity.221 Faced with the question of what standard of
causation is imposed by the word “because,” the Court chose the
demanding “but-for” standard over other, less restrictive standards.222
Nothing in the text obviously required or even strongly suggested this
result, and there were compelling arguments for a more expansive reading
of the word “because.”223 Yet, a five-member majority chose the more
narrow reading.
Lower courts have similarly chosen to interpret the Court’s retaliation
decisions in a particularly narrow fashion. Following Breeden, lower
courts could have taken into account the complex nature of discrimination
law when assessing whether an employee could have reasonably believed
that an employer’s conduct was unlawful. Instead, lower courts have
frequently adopted a highly restrictive reading of the reasonableness
220. See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
222. See supra notes 115–23 and accompanying text.
223. The four dissenting justices raised several concerns regarding the majority opinion. First, by
adopting a but-for standard, the Court established separate causation standards for discrimination and
retaliation claims. Aside from creating unnecessary confusion, the creation of a separate standard for
retaliation claims ignored the interconnected nature of the two theories. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr.
v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2537 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent was also critical
of the majority’s failure to defer to the EEOC’s position on the issue. Id. at 2543–44. The dissent also
noted that the adoption of a but-for standard was contrary to tort law’s handling of causation issues
in which multiple causes contribute to a result. Id. at 2546.
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requirement.224 Following Burlington Northern, lower courts could have
recognized the strong deterrent effect that threats of retaliation can have
on an employee’s willingness to oppose perceived unlawful
discrimination. Instead, lower courts have increasingly held as a matter of
law that employer actions such as negative employee evaluations and
threats of firing would not deter a reasonable employee from opposing
unlawful discrimination.225
The obvious question is why would courts consistently choose readings
of the statutory text and precedent that limit the protection afforded to the
victims of retaliation? Nassar provides perhaps the clearest answer. The
majority opinion in Nassar spends a fair amount of time attempting to
make sense of the legislative history and inconsistent statutory language
as well as the Court’s own decisions concerning the anti-discrimination
and anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).226 While the majority’s reading of Title VII’s
text to adopt a but-for standard of causation is certainly defensible, the
textualist case for such an interpretation is hardly compelling.227 Perhaps
aware of this fact, the majority devotes a portion of the opinion at the end
to explaining why, from a policy standpoint, its interpretation is
preferable.
The majority’s fears over intruding too heavily upon employer
discretion with respect to the workplace are almost palpable in this portion
of the opinion.228 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion points out “the everincreasing frequency” of retaliation claims and that “the number of
retaliation claims filed with the EEOC has now outstripped those for every
type of status-based discrimination except race.”229 The opinion then notes
the potential burden that the rise in retaliation cases places on judicial
resources.230 But beyond the burden on courts, there is a concern about the
224. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
226. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 at 2528–31 (majority opinion).
227. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
228. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority “appears
driven by a zeal to reduce the number of retaliation claims filed against employers”); Sandra F.
Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Fakers and Floodgates, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 223, 224 (2014) (stating
that the majority “used these concerns about fakers and floodgates to tip substantive discrimination
law in an employer-friendly direction”). It is noteworthy that the actual number of civil rights lawsuits
filed has declined over the same period while the number of retaliation charges filed with the EEOC
has increased. Id. at 236–37.
229. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531 (majority opinion).
230. See id. (noting concerns over “the fair and responsible allocation of resources in the judicial
and litigation systems”).
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burden on employers. Not only might adopting a less stringent causation
standard lead to more retaliation claims, doing so might also lead to more
frivolous claims, according to Justice Kennedy.231
Indeed, the concern that a less stringent causation standard would spur
more frivolous claims, thereby interfering with the ability of employers to
run their own shops and impose litigation burdens on employers, seems
to drive much of the opinion. In the majority’s view, a less strict causation
standard will allow bad employees who fear disciplinary action to
preemptively and falsely cry “discrimination” in an effort to set up a future
retaliation claim if they are subsequently fired.232 The idea that bad
employees often file frivolous claims of discrimination in order to deter
employers from taking adverse action against them for fear of retaliation
has long been an article of faith among many employers.233 That fear
found voice in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion: “an employee who
knows that he or she is about to be fired for poor performance, given a
lower pay grade, or even just transferred to a different assignment or
location . . . might be tempted to make an unfounded charge of racial,
sexual, or religious discrimination.”234 By engaging in what is at least
potentially protected opposition conduct, the complaining employee
might be able “to forestall [the employer’s] lawful action” by making an
employer fear the possibility of a retaliation claim.235 If the employer goes
ahead and makes a legitimate business decision about whether the

231. Id.; see also Shaninga v. St. Luke’s Med. Ctr. LP, No. CV-14-02475-PHX-GMS, 2016 WL
1408289, at *11 (D. Ariz. Apr. 11, 2016) (quoting Nassar and stating “the stronger ‘but-for causation’
standard serves to close the door on employees seeking to file even more frivolous retaliation claims”
(emphasis added)).
232. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532 (noting concerns over frivolous claims).
233. Jonathan A. Segal, Supreme Court’s Messages on Retaliation, Arbitration, and
Discrimination, in INSIDE THE MINDS: THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES
7, 11 (2010) (“[W]hile most employees who make complaints do so in good faith, there are times
when an employee engages in a pre-emptive strike by alleging discrimination and harassment before
an employment action is taken; and if an adverse action is taken at a later time, it may appear
retaliatory.”); Robert J. Grossman, Diffusing Discrimination Claims, HR MAG. (May 1, 2009),
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/pages/0509grossman.aspx [https://perma.cc/DF4
8-XN59] (explaining that retaliation “claims can be engineered” by filing a discrimination claim and
that by doing so, an employee is “painting himself with a coat of Teflon”); Paul Falcone, Avoid the
Preemptive Strike, PAULFALCONEHR (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.paulfalconehr.net/avoid-thepreemptive-strike/ [https://perma.cc/AJE4-VY5G] (“[W]orkers are realizing more and more that it
may be in their best interests to lodge a complaint with HR before you, their supervisor, have an
opportunity to discipline or terminate them.”); Flander, supra note 62, at 20 (relating observation of
defense lawyer that there is “more of a willingness among employees to use retaliation claims as
covers for their poor job performance”).
234. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532.
235. Id.
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employee should keep her job, get paid the same, or be reassigned to a
different job or location, the employee could turn around and sue for
retaliation, knowing that a more favorable causation standard might make
it more difficult for a court “to dismiss dubious claims at the summary
judgment stage.”236 In short, concerns over the possibility that the threat
of a retaliation claim might result in additional litigation costs and impact
the discretion afforded to employers under the employment at-will
doctrine mitigate in favor of a stringent causation standard.
This portion of Nassar is one of the clearest expressions one can expect
to find regarding the concerns that underlie some of the restrictive
approaches federal courts have taken with respect to retaliation claims:
there are too many trivial retaliation claims clogging up the docket and
impacting the ability of employers to run their workplaces. Lower courts
have raised similar concerns regarding retaliation claims. As one court
suggested, employers may be “paralyzed into inaction once an employee
has lodged a complaint under Title VII, making such a complaint
tantamount to a ‘get out of jail free’ card for employees engaged in job
misconduct.”237
This theme is perhaps even more prevalent in retaliation cases in which
the primary issue is whether an employee suffered a materially adverse
action. Every day, an employer makes decisions or implements decisions
concerning what the essential functions of a job are, who performs them,
and when, where, and how they are performed. A retaliation claim
involving the issue of whether an employer’s actions were materially
adverse goes to the core of the discretion afforded to employers by the
employment at-will rule. As explained by one court in the context of a
retaliation decision, “[w]ork assignment claims strike at the very heart of
an employer’s business judgment and expertise because they challenge an
employer’s ability to allocate its assets in response to shifting and
competing market priorities.”238
This type of statement perhaps explains the strict approach some courts
take on the issue of material adversity; the more broadly the concept of
material adversity is defined, the greater the impact on an employer’s

236. Id.
237. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Drottz v. Park
Electrochemical Corp., No. CV 11-1596-PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 6157858, at *15 (D. Ariz. Nov. 25,
2013) (explaining that a less stringent causation standard “would transmute an employee’s preemptive
engagement in a protected activity, whether frivolous or not, into a shield against the imminent
consequences of poor job performance”).
238. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1244 (11th Cir. 2001).
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decision-making authority concerning the minutiae of the workplace.239
As a result, one frequently sees courts in these cases trotting out the almost
boilerplate observation that anti-discrimination statutes do not authorize
courts to act as a “super-personnel department,” second-guessing
employers’ business decisions and intervening whenever employees feel
they are being treated unjustly.240 This sentiment is usually conveyed in
the process of concluding that the harms that an employee suffered were
merely minor annoyances or inconveniences and that the law does not
guarantee an employee a genial boss.241
The Court’s decision in Crawford is also consistent with this idea. On
its face, Crawford appears to be a case in which the Supreme Court could
be expected to interpret Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision strictly in
order to avoid judicial meddling in an employer’s internal affairs. Recall
that Crawford involved retaliatory conduct on the part of an employer
who was conducting an internal investigation into alleged sexual
harassment.242 This seems like the sort of internal process lying deep
within the shadow of employer discretion that the Court would seem
hesitant to interfere with. Yet, the Court held that the employee’s act of
providing “an ostensibly disapproving account of sexually obnoxious
behavior toward her by a fellow employee” was protected activity under
Title VII’s opposition clause.243 The Court’s decision seems considerably
less intrusive upon employer discretion when one considers just how
extreme the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the language
in the opposition clause truly was. According to the Sixth Circuit, it was
not enough that an employee merely oppose unlawful conduct; an
239. See Brake, supra note 61, at 155 (“The strictness of the reasonable belief doctrine may well
mask an unarticulated concern in retaliation cases that the law not intrude too deeply into employer
prerogatives to base employment decisions on discretionary reasons—for example, the employment
at-will doctrine.”).
240. Lisdahl v. Mayo Found., 633 F.3d 712, 722 (8th Cir. 2011); Barren v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter
R.R. Corp., No. 13 CV 4390, 2016 WL 861183, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2016); Moat v. Aaron’s, Inc.,
No. 4:13-CV-181-VEH, 2014 WL 5860574, at *10 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 12, 2014); Levitant v. N.Y.C.
Human Res. Admin., 914 F. Supp. 2d 281, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Webb v. Niagara County, No. 11CV-192S, 2012 WL 5499647, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2012); Beverly v. Kaupas, No. 05 C 6338,
2008 WL 62404, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 29, 2008); Bozeman v. Per-Se Tech., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d
1282, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Mowery v. Escambia Cty. Utils. Auth., No. 3:04CV382-RS-EMT, 2006
WL 327965, at *20 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2006); see also Wolf v. MWH Constructors, Inc., 34 F. Supp.
3d 1213, 1224, 1227 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (using the phrase in reference to employer’s actions that formed
the basis for plaintiff’s discrimination claim and then concluding that the same actions were not
materially adverse for purposes of plaintiff’s retaliation claim).
241. Lisdahl, 633 F.3d at 722; Levitant, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 300.
242. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271 (2009); supra notes 17–19 and
accompanying text.
243. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276.
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employee must engage in “active, consistent ‘opposing’ activities” before
conduct is protected.244 This rather extreme interpretation was
inconsistent with ordinary understandings of the word “oppose.”
Moreover, Crawford presented an extremely unusual situation that was
unlikely to repeat itself often. When asked, as part of the investigation,
whether harassment had occurred, the plaintiff answered in the affirmative
and apparently did so in a way that conveyed her disapproval of the
harassment. Ordinarily, it is not terribly difficult to decide whether an
employee has opposed employer conduct. Crawford presents the one-ina-hundred case in which the employee’s actions are difficult to classify.
But it seems obvious in hindsight that if Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision was going to serve any useful purpose in addressing
discrimination, the Court had no choice but to declare that the plaintiff
engaged in protected activity; it was simply a question of categorization.
By declaring the plaintiff’s conduct to be protected under the opposition
clause under these limited circumstances, the Court was hardly throwing
open the floodgates of litigation. And by classifying the conduct as
opposition conduct as opposed to participation conduct—thereby forcing
future employees in this unusual situation to establish that they reasonably
believed the conduct opposed was unlawful—the Court helped limit the
potential impact of the decision on employer discretion.
To be clear, this phenomenon is hardly unique to ADA and retaliation
cases. Courts routinely bring out the “super-personnel department”
language in discrimination cases of all stripes, most often when explaining
why an employer has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its actions and why the plaintiff has failed to show that the asserted reason
is a pretext for discrimination.245 And this is hardly the first article to posit
that court decisions in the employment context may be influenced by fears
concerning the floodgates of litigation and impinging upon the
employment at-will rule. But these concerns are even more pronounced in
retaliation and disability discrimination cases than in traditional
discrimination cases.
Much like the potential impact the ADA’s reasonable accommodation
requirement has on employee discretion regarding virtually every aspect

244. Id. at 275 (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 211 F. App’x 373, 376 (6th Cir.
2006)).
245. See, e.g., Marcinuk v. Lew, No. 13-CV-12722, 2016 WL 111409, at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 11,
2016) (using “super personnel department” language and stating that to establish pretext, plaintiff
“must offer evidence of such strength and quality . . . to permit a reasonable finding that [the adverse
action] was obviously or manifestly unsupported” (alterations in original) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted)).
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of the workplace,246 Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision addresses a range
of employer actions not addressed by Title VII’s anti-discrimination
provision. Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision covers more forms of
employer action and decisions than its anti-discrimination provision.247
The anti-discrimination provision prohibits only adverse employment
actions, which are, by definition, limited to employer actions that concern
employment.248 To qualify as an adverse employment action, the
employer’s action must materially affect the compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.249 In some circuits, the term is
defined so narrowly that it only includes “ultimate employment
decisions,” such as hiring, firing, promotion, and demotions.250 As the
Supreme Court held in Burlington Northern, Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision covers a much wider array of retaliatory conduct. While the
anti-retaliation provision does not address “petty slights or minor
annoyances” in the workplace,251 it does address a range of discretionary,
day-to-day managerial decisions that the employment at-will rule largely
immunizes from judicial second-guessing. This potentially includes
assignment of less desirable job duties;252 reassignment to a less desirable
location or department;253 schedule changes;254 threatening a complaining
employee with discipline, passing an employee over for training, and
moving the employee to a less desirable office;255 preparing unfair
performance evaluations;256 and formal reprimands.257
246. See supra notes 191–97 and accompanying text.
247. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).
248. See id. at 63 (explaining that Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision covers “employer
actions and harm that concern employment and the workplace”).
249. Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Jackman v. Fifth
Judicial Dist. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 728 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2013) (“An adverse employment
action is defined as a tangible change in working conditions that produces a material employment
disadvantage, including but not limited to termination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes that affect
an employee’s future career prospects.”).
250. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997).
251. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68.
252. Id. at 70.
253. Leslie v. Noble Drilling, LLC, No. H-16-0610, 2017 WL 1051131, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 17,
2017).
254. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 69 (recognizing the potential for a schedule change to constitute a
materially adverse action); Spalding v. City of Chicago, 186 F. Supp. 3d 884, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
(involving shift change as possible materially adverse action).
255. Kretzman v. Erie County, No. 11-CV-0704, 2013 WL 636545, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,
2013); Loya v. Sebelius, 840 F. Supp. 2d 245, 252–53 (D.D.C. 2012).
256. Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
257. Millea v. Metro-N. R.R., 658 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2011).
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Given the potential impact on employer discretion and the concomitant
burden on courts to review employers’ discretionary decisions, courts are
seeking to limit the reach of retaliation law. With the ADA, courts
developed a demanding approach to the definition of disability to prevent
them from having to review an employer’s decision whether to grant a
reasonable accommodation. In the retaliation context, courts have been
able to develop a similar set of interpretive tools that often have the same
effect.
IV. PAST AS PROLOGUE: WHAT THE HISTORY OF
DISABILITY LAW CAN TEACH US ABOUT THE FUTURE
OF RETALIATION LAW
The story arcs of modern disability law and retaliation law reveal an
important lesson for employees: as a general rule, the greater the potential
for a statute to intrude upon employer discretion regarding day-to-day
decisions, the less likely a court is to interpret the statute in that manner.
Stated differently, the deeper a statute potentially intrudes upon the
discretion traditionally afforded to employers under the employment atwill rule, the less receptive a court will be to interpretive arguments that
would produce that result.258
With this guiding principle in mind, the following Part briefly considers
what can be done moving forward to better further the goals of antiretaliation provisions and protect employees from unlawful retaliation.
And, once again, the history of the ADA proves instructive.
A.

The ADA Amendments Act: Congressional Response to the
Disability Backlash

In its original form, the ADA was a more detailed statute than Title
VII.259 Unlike Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
traits that everyone possesses (race, sex, national origin, etc.), the ADA
protected only a particular class of people: qualified individuals with
disabilities.260 Thus, at least in this context, there was a more pressing
need to define the relevant class.
258. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
259. See Judith L. Johnson, Rescue the Americans with Disabilities Act from Restrictive
Interpretations: Alcoholism as an Illustration, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 169, 182 (2007) (noting that
while many of the ADA’s provisions were taken from Title VII, “the discrimination provisions of the
ADA are much more specific”).
260. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b), 104 Stat. 327, 329
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012)).
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The original language of the ADA employed “a thicket of interlocking
definitions and requirements” to help define the concept of a “qualified
individual with a disability.”261 However, several of these definitions
provided limited guidance. Instead of defining the concept of “reasonable
accommodation,” Congress instead simply included a relatively short list
of illustrative accommodations.262 Congress placed an “undue hardship”
limit on an employer’s reasonable accommodation obligation but included
only the most general of definitions for that term.263 As discussed, the
definition of “disability” was itself quite vague. For example, to meet this
threshold, a plaintiff needed to establish the existence of an impairment
that substantially limited a major life activity. However, the term “major
life activity” was not defined in the Act.264 This led to numerous disputes
over the meaning of the word “major”;265 whether certain activities (e.g.,
performing manual tasks) qualified as major life activities;266 and whether
bodily functions, such as eliminating waste from one’s blood, could
qualify as major life activities.267
In this respect, the original version of the ADA and Title VII were fairly
representative of older statutes in terms of their overall lack of specificity.
After the enactment of the ADA, statutes have tended to become more
detailed. As Professor Jarrod Shobe has observed, more modern statutes
(which he defines as those drafted in the late 1990s and beyond) are more
precise and detailed than their predecessors and are “replete with complex
definitions and exceptions.”268 As a result, there is simply less room for
judicial interpretation.269

261. Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 (1996).
262. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 101(9), 104 Stat. at 331 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(9)).
263. Id. § 101(10), 104 Stat. at 331 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)).
264. Id. § 101, 104 Stat. at 330–31.
265. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (concluding that the phrase
“major life activities” “refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily life”); Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 659–60 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (questioning whether the word
“major” in the definition indicates “comparative importance” or “greater in quantity, number, or
extent”).
266. See Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 196–97 (concluding that to fit within the definition, “the
manual tasks in question must be central to daily life”).
267. See Long, supra note 155, at 222–23 (discussing this issue).
268. Shobe, supra note 204, at 813.
269. Id. at 853.
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The ADAAA is representative of these types of more modern
statutes.270 The original version of the ADA included a Findings and
Purposes section that described the types of discrimination individuals
with disabilities had faced and the need for action.271 But when Congress
amended the ADA, it added detailed findings and purposes that describe
Congress’s objections to the courts’ interpretation of the original Act.272
For example, over the course of several paragraphs, the Findings and
Purposes section of the ADAAA explicitly rejects the reasoning and legal
standards that emerged from Supreme Court decisions and explains in
greater details the underlying purposes of the Act.273 Courts now routinely
cite to this language as they consider ADA claims that would once have
probably floundered on the question of whether a plaintiff had a
disability.274 The ADAAA also added considerable detail to the definition
of disability, including rules of construction regarding some of the more
problematic and controversial definitional issues that had arisen.275 In
addition, the amendments add a fairly substantial illustrative list of major
life activities and clarify that the term “major life activity” covers major
bodily functions.276
As a result of these changes, ADA plaintiffs have enjoyed much greater
success on the threshold question of whether a disability exists.277 The
ADAAA has significantly limited the need for judicial interpretation of
the terms in the definition of disability and it has made application of those
270. See Barry, supra note 173, at 20 (explaining that the guiding principle of the ADAAA “was
to leave nothing important to legislative history—get it all in the text, and use legislative history as a
safety net and a blueprint for agencies to follow in promulgating regulations”). Professor Barry
explains, “[t]he ADA is a micromanager statute; courts should not be botching the disability analysis
by failing to consider rules of construction clearly enumerated in the statute’s text.” Id. at 33.
271. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104 Stat. 327, 328–29.
272. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–34 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)).
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., Ramdeen v. Trihop 69th St., LLC, No. 16-1361, 2017 WL 930431, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 9, 2017) (explaining why pre-ADAAA decision calling for strict interpretation of terms within
the definition of disability was no longer relevant); Gard v. Dooley, No. 4:41-CV-04023-LLP, 2017
WL 782279, at *5 (D.S.D. Feb. 28, 2017) (explaining that pre-ADAAA caselaw required that
mitigating measures be taken into account when determining whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity).
275. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–57 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102). For example, the ADAAA contains a section explaining how courts should approach the
question of whether to take into account the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as
medication or devices when assessing whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity. Id.
276. Id.
277. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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terms much simpler. In contrast, Congress chose not to provide greater
clarity to the concepts of reasonable accommodation, essential functions,
and undue burden.278 As a result, courts are left to deal with difficult
interpretive issues that directly implicate employer discretion in
meaningful ways. Not surprisingly, ADA plaintiffs continue to face
significant difficulty on these issues even after the passage of the
ADAAA.279
B.

Retaliation

The history of the ADA provides a model for those interested in
protecting employees from retaliation. Creative interpretive arguments
and calls for courts to pay attention to the underlying purposes of the
statutory language failed miserably in the case of the ADA and are
increasingly failing in the case anti-retaliation provisions. In light of the
tendency of courts to interpret and apply the language of anti-retaliation
provisions in ways that preserve employer discretion with respect to the
minutiae of the workplace, anti-retaliation advocates need to seek a
legislative fix. The ADA Amendments Act provides a useful example,
both positive and negative.
The ADAAA serves as a positive example in terms of the greater clarity
and guidance it provides to courts. Congress could do something similar
with respect to retaliation law. First, Congress could include an updated
findings and purposes section that makes explicit that one of the primary
purposes of anti-retaliation provisions is to prevent employer interference
with unfettered access to a statute’s remedial mechanisms. 280 The section
could also briefly summarize some of the realities associated with
workplace retaliation, such as the reluctance many employees have to
report concerns over unlawful discrimination, how strongly fears over
retaliation tend to dissuade such reporting, and the financial and emotional
impact some employees have faced after having been retaliated against.
Finally, like the ADAAA, this new section could identify specific
congressional objections to previous federal decisions, such as holding
employees to an unrealistic standard in terms of the reasonableness of
their beliefs regarding whether employer conduct was unlawful.281
In addition, the amendments could add clarity to each portion of the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. In defining protected conduct under the
278.
279.
280.
281.

See Long, supra note 155 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 164–72 and accompanying text.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
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opposition clause, the amendments could incorporate Breeden’s
reasonable belief but clarify, as the ADAAA did with respect to the
definition of disability,282 that this standard should be construed in favor
of broad coverage. The amendments could incorporate the likely-todissuade-a-reasonable-employee standard from Burlington Northern in
defining what types of retaliation are actionable. And much in the same
way the ADAAA clarified the “major life activities” concept, the
amendments could also provide an illustrative list of employer actions that
might well dissuade a reasonable employee from opposing unlawful
conduct and that courts sometimes rule as a matter of law do not rise to
this level, including threatened termination or negative evaluations.283
Finally, much in the same way the ADAAA expressly rejected some of
the Supreme Court’s specific holdings regarding the ADA’s definition of
disability,284 the amendments could explicitly reject the Supreme Court’s
holding in Nassar regarding the but-for causation standard and adopt
something more akin to a motivating factor standard.285
The ADAAA also provides an example of the dangers of a piecemeal
approach to statutory amendment. Ideally, Congress would undertake a
comprehensive reform of all of discrimination law, including retaliation
law.286 Failing that, Congress would enact a measure adopting a uniform
retaliation standard for all federal workplace statutes to replace the current
piecemeal approach, which often results in different language and
different standards for seemingly no good reason.287 Failing that,
Congress could at least amend the dominant statutes in the field—Title
VII, the ADA, and the ADEA—to include the suggested revisions.
But unless the political realities mandate doing so, Congress should
avoid the piecemeal approach it took with respect to the ADAAA. The
amendments took aim at specific federal court decisions regarding the
definition of disability but left untouched the portions of the statute
covering reasonable accommodations. Not surprisingly, courts have
interpreted those portions in a manner that limits their reach.288 It would
perhaps be tempting for Congress to simply overrule Nassar, the most
282. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102).
283. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
285. Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2012) (recognizing this
standard), rev’d, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
286. William R. Corbett, Calling on Congress: Take a Page from Parliament’s Playbook and Fix
Employment Discrimination Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135, 136 (2013) (calling on Congress
to undertake a comprehensive reform of employment discrimination law).
287. See Long, supra note 48, at 569–76 (calling for such a standard).
288. See supra notes 164–72 and accompanying text.
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recent and high profile judicial limitation on the reach of anti-retaliation
law. But this sort of tinkering around the edges fails to account for the
likelihood that if courts are required to apply a more lenient causation
standard, they are likely to continue to interpret and apply the rest of the
statute in a manner that limits its impact on employer discretion.
CONCLUSION
The judicial fears associated with serving in the role of “superpersonnel department” are especially strong in the case of retaliation
cases. While acts of employer retaliation sometimes trigger an almost
intuitive sense of injustice, the concerns over second-guessing the types
of managerial decisions that make up the average workday have greatly
influenced judicial decisions in the retaliation area. These same concerns
originally prompted a judicial backlash that thwarted the reach of the
ADA to the point that legislative reform was the only solution. Antiretaliation law is gradually heading in this same direction. Given the
similarities in terms of the development of the law, employee rights
advocates should take a page from the history of disability law and seek
broad legislative reform.

